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Abstract 
We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers' 
discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value 
above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can 
be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of 
who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that the same 
firm wins repeatedly, and it does not deteriorate (and may improve) the procurement outcomes we 
observe. The effects of discretion persist when we repeat the analysis controlling for the geographical 
location, corruption, social capital and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running 
the auctions. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we use a regression discontinuity design to document the effect of government
discretion on public goods provision.1 We analyze a large database for public procurement
works in Italy to estimate the causal effect of increased buyer discretion – measured in
terms of ability to discretionally exclude some bidders by using restricted auctions where
only invited bidders can bid – on both ex ante procurement outcomes (number of bidders,
winning rebates, and type of winners) and ex post performance measures (completion time,
delays in delivery, cost overrun).
The benefits from open, competitive auctions have been widely documented by economi-
sts with respect to a number of different markets. When we talk about government pro-
curement, however, the praise for open, transparent auctions goes well beyond their effects
on competitive outcomes. Administrative science and law scholars regarded open compe-
tition as a crucial “preventive tool” to ensure public sector accountability long before
Vickrey’s famous contribution. Open auctions with transparent rules are seen as a power-
ful tool to limit government discretion and its abuse. The several independent stakeholders
they generate – competitors – should have the information, ability and incentives to act as
effective watchdogs against favoritism and corruption (when they do not collude). Hence,
the administrative rules of many countries and the recommendations of international or-
ganizations (such as the UN and the World Bank) prescribe whenever possible the use of
open, transparent auctions.
Open auctions, however, are typically more complex and costly to organize than less
transparent procurement processes. Therefore, the prescription is often tighter when the
amount at stake, and thus the temptation to bribe, is larger. In most countries and
organizations (and even in some large firms, which are not immune from accountability
problems), there are “thresholds” for the value of the transaction above which the discre-
tion of the buyer in charge is limited by the obligation to use open competitive procedures.
The US Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), for example, has the “simplified acquisition
threshold” set at a contract value of $150,000. Below this value threshold, several reporting
1Public sector procurement accounts for 15-20% of the GDP of OECD countries. An effective procure-
ment policy is therefore essential to the delivery of works and the allocation of many goods and services.
The question of how discretion affects organizations’ performance, however, has an importance that goes
well beyond the organization and the functioning of public procurement markets.
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requirements do not apply, such as the Miller Act (requiring performance bonds). These
thresholds may allow the identification of the causal effects of the variables that discretely
change at the threshold on outcomes using a regression discontinuity design (henceforth
RDD). It is a threshold of this type that we exploit to try to gauge the causal effect of
buyer discretion on the procurement outcomes we are able to observe.
The empirical exercise we propose is particularly interesting when the object of the
transaction is a procurement contract, that is, a promise. Recent research on transaction
costs, contract theory and procurement has identified as many drawbacks as advantages
of open auctions, particularly for complex transactions. Limits to contracting and en-
forcement linked to asymmetric information and transaction costs may lead open auctions
to have rather negative effects on the procurement outcomes, if important quality di-
mensions are not sufficiently protected by the credible threat of a contractual remedy
(Spulber, 1990; Manelli and Vincent, 1995). Discretion may then help, rather than harm,
as it allows incomplete contracts to be complemented with dynamic informal governance
mechanisms typical of the private sector, such as long-term relationships and reputation
(Bannerjee and Duflo, 2000; Malcomson, 2013). Administrative rules that try to prevent
corruption by limiting ex ante discretion may limit abuses but also make it difficult for
honest and capable public managers to use these important mechanisms that, much the
same as corruption, need a certain degree of discretion (Banfield, 1975).2 Both the positive
and negative effects of discretion are likely to be relevant to at least some degree, so the
empirical question is which effect dominates in a given institutional environment.
Steven Kelman recognized these problems in his academic work (Kelman, 1990) and
played a key role in reforming US procurement rules when serving as Administrator of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy during the first Clinton administration. The
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act
of 1995 substantially increased flexibility and discretion in US procurement. Some legal
2Discretion also needs ex post performance monitoring to maintain accountability. Administrative
systems that severely limit ex ante public servants’ discretion at the selection stage often lead to neglect of
ex post performance controls, relocating the accountability problem from the selection stage to the project
execution one. A supplier planning to bribe a civil servant to allow for lower performance standards at
the project execution stage can bid much more aggressively and “honestly” win the selection process in
a transparent and well run open auction. Renegotiation and cost overrun are well known forms of this
phenomenon (Guash, Laffont and Straub, 2008).
2
experts, however, are now arguing that this went too far, and that both accountability and
performance have fallen in the US in recent years (e.g., Yukins, 2008), without, however,
producing evidence in support of the claims. Analogous debates are taking place on the
rigidity of EU Procurement Directives, which are strongly influenced by French civil law
and are trying to coordinate procurement rules across European countries (e.g. Spagnolo,
2012). Some of these debates specifically focus on where to set the threshold above which
EU rules should apply, and seem to be particularly heated in countries like Sweden, where
public servants have traditionally enjoyed substantial discretion.
It is hard, therefore, to be in favor of or against these rules and thresholds without some
robust empirical evidence on their effects. Surprisingly, these debates are typically based
on back of the envelope calculations of the administrative costs of different procurement
mechanisms, which even if correct, are likely to be negligible relative to the effects on
procurement outcomes and on the accountability of the public sector. In Sweden, for
example, a procurement inquiry by the government suggested increasing the threshold for
direct (non-competitive) contract awards from about 300,000 SEK to 600,000 SEK. The
Director of the Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate presented a report arguing that this
would reduce competition and increase costs for the public sector (see Molander 2014).
The procurement inquiry contended that these effects would be overshadowed by reduced
transaction costs and more flexibility, and that the report used a limited data set and was
mostly based on rough approximations but did not present additional evidence in support
of the proposal either.
In this paper we try to contribute to filling this knowledge gap by measuring as rigor-
ously as we can the effects of the increased buyer discretion allowed below these thresholds
on a set of public procurement outcomes. We exploit a threshold determined by the Ital-
ian procurement regulation, such that works with a value above the threshold have to be
awarded through an open auction in almost all cases. Works below the threshold can more
easily be run through a restricted auction, where the buyer has discretion in terms of who
(not) to invite to bid.
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the value of the project (i.e.,
the auction starting value representing the reserve price for the public buyer running the
auction) is not perfectly manipulated around the discontinuity threshold. We test this
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assumption using graphical and statistical tests discussed by McCrary (2008) and Lee
(2008), and focus on the sample of projects for construction works that do not show
sorting around the threshold. In contrast, we drop from our sample road works where
bunching around the threshold appears to be a problem.3
We further select our sample using the procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalya-
naraman (2012). Specifically, we consider auctions with a project value within the inter-
val around the discontinuity threshold selected with the optimal bandwidth method. In
this quasi-experimental set-up, projects with a value within a small interval around the
threshold are likely to be identical in terms of observable (e.g., entry-requirements) and
unobservable (e.g., complexity) characteristics, and increased public buyer discretion is as
if quasi-randomly assigned across treated and controls projects.
Our main result is that increased discretion (i.e., our treatment) causes a significant
increase in the probability that the same firm is awarded a project repeatedly by the
same public buyer. While this result – considered in isolation – could be interpreted in a
variety of different ways (productive relationships, saving set-up costs, favoring “friends”
or repeated exchanges with bribes), to our knowledge this is the first time that this causal
effect is identified with some degree of precision and robustness.
To try to understand how to interpret this finding, we analyse the impact of discretion
on other auction outcomes that we are able to observe in our dataset. In our main sample,
we find that discretion has no effect on ex ante auction outcomes (number of bidders,
rebates, size of the winners, distance of the winner from the public buyer) and on most of
our ex post performance measures (i.e., duration of the works; monetary renegotiations).
We find some evidence that discretion may increase delays in the delivery of the works, but
this evidence turns out not to be robust. In a closer neighbourhood of the discontinuity
threshold (i.e., a smaller sample), we find evidence that the positive effects of discretion
may dominate the negative ones. Discretion appears to reduce the total duration of
3 We discuss the importance of this assumption in Section 5. One possible explanation of the presence
of sorting in this sub-sample can be attributed to the increased flexibility of contracting authorities in
dividing the road in projects covering different length. We plan to study the reasons behind the observed
sorting around the threshold and its effects on road work outcomes in a separate paper, as it requires
somewhat different statistical methodologies and precise assumptions on the process of sorting around
the threshold. A preliminary exploration in Konkurresverket (2015) suggests that - in the case of Italian
roads - bunching below the threshold and the increased discretion it generates seem to be associated with
somewhat better procurement outcomes.
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the works; to lead to the selection of larger (incorporated) firms, which have typically
better quality control systems; and to reduce the number of firms submitting bids, saving
administrative costs associated to bid screening. Other outcomes, like the winning rebate,
cost overrun and the probability that the project is awarded to a local firm, are not
significantly affected by the degree of discretion.
Although the time it takes to deliver the works is a crucial quality dimension of the
procurement process (Lewis and Bajari, 2011, 2014) our results should be considered with
caution because, as in all other papers in this literature, there are other quality dimensions
that we do not observe and cannot control for. A possible alternative explanation to our
results is that discretion increases the number of repeated wins by incumbent contractors
but reduces the unobserved quality of delivered works because of corrupt preferential
relationships between public buyers and favored contractors. We explore this possibility by
looking at two additional pieces of evidence. First, we repeat our RDD analysis controlling
for geographical location, corruption, social capital and judicial efficiency in the region
of the public buyers running the auctions. Our evidence suggests that the effects of
discretion we identified are robust to the inclusion of these institutional factors as controls.
Second, we explore the relationship between projects’ past and future delays in delivery
and winners’ past and future incumbency. We run a propensity score matching analysis
and find that contractors who have won in the past systematically deliver current works
faster. In addition, contractors characterized by better past performance are more likely to
win current auctions. These estimates are sizeable and statistically significant for contracts
with a value below the 300,000 euro threshold, where the law allows public buyers to use
discretion. These correlations suggest that positive productive relationships may dominate
negative corrupt relationships in our sample.
A possible caveat in interpreting our results comes from the fact that the auction
format used to allocate procurement contracts in our data is somewhat unconventional,
as it has some “beauty contest” features whereby the highest bidder does not necessarily
win. We use the theoretical predictions of Albano et al. (2006), Decarolis (2014), and
Conley and Decarolis (2015), and the experimental evidence reported in Chang et al.
(2015), to guide our empirical analysis. Specifically, their main results are consistent with
the evidence in our data of a positive and significant relationship between the number of
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bidders and the rebates submitted by these bidders. We also find a positive and significant
relationship between the number of bidders and the winning rebate (the maximum rebate)
in a small sub-sample of first-price auctions managed by the municipality and province
of Turin from the 2003. In this sub-sample, we also replicate our RDD analysis and find
qualitatively identical results, although these results are less precisely estimated given the
smaller sample size.
We use our overall evidence to conclude that, in the environment we study, increased
discretion raises the number of repeated wins by contractors, as in long term (collaborative
or collusive) relationships, and need not result in worst public procurement outcomes, on
average. Indeed, we have some evidence, albeit not robust, of a small positive overall effect
of discretion on the procurement outcomes we observe. Taken together, these results can
be coherently interpreted with the evidence in Bandiera et al. (2009) that, for public
procurement of goods and services in Italy, corruption is not higher for public buyers
with higher discretion, while the prices they pay are significantly lower than average. The
results also seem consistent with Kelman (1990) and Banfield (1975) who argued early on
that some discretion (coupled with ex post performance checks) is essential to good public
management, even at the cost of a small loss in accountability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3 and 4, we describe the institutional framework and the data. In
Section 5, we present the identification strategy. In Section 6 we present the empirical
analysis and the main results, and then we assess the robustness of these results. In Section
7, we report additional results on the relationship between winners’ incumbency and ex
post performance. In Section 8, we conclude.
2 Related Literature
This paper directly contributes to the literature that studies the impact of competition and
reputation in procurement with incomplete contracts. Previous theoretical papers have
shown that – under the assumption that procurement contracts are incomplete – the results
on the optimality of open auctions (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 1996, 2009) need not apply.
Spulber (1990) shows that with incomplete contracting, competition spurs moral hazard
and ex post opportunism of contractors in the construction industry. Manelli and Vincent
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(1995) show that when the non-contractible quality dimensions of the procured good
are the most important ones, open competitive auctions on contractible dimensions (e.g.,
price) are the worst among all of the conceivable allocation mechanisms. Bajari and Tadelis
(2001) show that bilateral negotiations may be better than competition for highly complex
projects; the more complex the project being procured is, the more costly completing the
project is and the more valuable flexibility is. In a dynamic framework, auctions with
a choice of participants depending on past performance may allow the buyer to take
into account reputational forces and establish long-term relationships that may improve
performance (Kim, 1998, Doni, 2006). With limited enforcement, Calzolari and Spagnolo
(2009) show that restricted auctions might be the optimal procurement mechanism, even
when the auctioneer can attribute bonuses to reward past performance. This literature
concludes that it is plausible that when contracts are incomplete, (buyer) discretion in the
form of not allowing some suppliers to bid can have positive effects on public procurement
outcomes.
On the empirical side, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) study the Indian software industry
and find that reputation is positively correlated with low incentive contracts (e.g., time-
material instead of fixed-cost contracts) and reputable contractors tend to bear a lower
share of cost overrun. Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2009) analyse a sample of contracts
for the construction of (private) buildings in Northern California and find that restricted
auctions and negotiations are more likely to be used in highly complex projects or if there
is a smaller pool of potential contractors. They also point out that in restricted auctions
it is more likely that more reputable contractors are selected. Gil and Marion (2013)
analyse the effect of repeated interaction in the subcontractors market for California’s
highways and find that past interaction has an effect on bidding behavior only if there is
the expectation of future profits. Lalive and Schmutzler (2011) study the procurement of
the railway service in Germany, comparing negotiations (with the incumbent) and open
auctions. They find evidence that negotiations correlate with lower consumer surplus,
increasing prices for similar services. Chever and Moore (2012) and Chever et al. (2013)
reach a different conclusion studying construction of social housing in France. They find
that negotiations after an informal auction are associated with lower costs relative to open
auctions. Kang and Miller (2015) estimate a procurement auction model where the extent
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of competition is optimally chosen by public buyers, and find that limiting competition
need not result in higher procurement costs.
The contribution of our paper to this literature is twofold. First, it provides the first
causal estimates of the effects of increased discretion on procurement auction outcomes
(i.e., participation, bidding, and characteristics of the winners). Second, it leverages the
fact that its database contains information on some ex post performance measures, such
as the time taken to deliver the works and cost overrun, to provide evidence on the causal
effects of discretion on those final procurement outcomes. In this respect, this paper also
complements the results of Lewis and Bajari (2011, 2013), who use highway construction to
point out that slow completion inflicts a negative externality on commuters and therefore
social welfare depends also on how quickly the works are delivered.
This paper also contributes to a small emerging empirical literature documenting the
effect of discretion on the performance of public agencies. Our paper provides corrobo-
rating evidence to the result (among many others) of Bandiera et al. (2009) that overall
waste in the procurement of Italian goods and services is substantially smaller for more
autonomous public purchasing authorities that enjoy more discretion than others. As
Bandiera et al. (2009) do, we provide causal evidence on how public administrations use
discretion in Italy. Our paper completes the assessment of the effects of discretion by
analyzing data on ex post performance measures that were not available to Bandiera et al.
(2009), by studying a very different industry (public works) where contract incompleteness
is a crucial issue; and focusing on how past performance can be indirectly rewarded when
restricted auctions allow for the possibility of discretionally not inviting some (e.g., poorly
performing) suppliers. A recent related study in this literature is Duflo et al. (2015), which
reports on a large field experiment on environmental regulation and its enforcement in In-
dia. They show, among other things, that regulatory discretion is highly valuable in that
environment because it allows the regulator to better target inspections at extreme pol-
luters, compared to transparent random auditing rules. Our study, as Duflo et al. (2015),
shows that regulatory discretion may be a valuable tool for public administrations.
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3 The Institutional Framework
In our analysis, a key role is played by the value of the project, which represents the
reserve price (i.e., the starting value) of the auction and the maximum price a public buyer
is willing to pay for a project. For each auction, the value of the project is estimated by
an engineer employed by the public buyer that runs the auction. The engineer evaluates
the types and quantities of inputs needed to complete it. The value of the project is then
obtained by multiplying these inputs by their prices taken from a menu of standardized
costs and summing up these products. For this reason, we agree with Decarolis (2014)
when he argues that the public buyer running the auction is not in full control of the value
of the project, and cannot set the value of the project in a different way on the basis of
the auction format chosen (i.e., just below or above the 300,000 euro threshold).
Italian procurement law specifies three auction formats for public procurement works.
Pubblico Incanto is an open auction in which every firm with the required certification can
participate. Licitazione Privata is a restricted auction in which the public buyer invites
a number of certified bidders. However, a certified firm that was not invited can ask to
be included in the list of invited bidders and the public buyer cannot refuse access. This
feature makes the Licitazione Privata appear similar to an open auction, provided that
public buyers guarantee a certain level of publicity of the call for tenders (see Coviello and
Mariniello, 2014). Finally, Trattativa Privata is an award mechanism whereby the public
buyer has wider discretion in selecting the firms participating in the auction.4
The possibility of using a Trattativa Privata (our treatment) is a function of the project
value.5 For works with a value above 300,000 euros, it can be used only in cases of
disaster or other extreme conditions, which have to be notified and justified by the public
buyer to the Italian Authority for Public Procurement. For works with a value below
4There is also a fourth format, Appalto Concorso, but it is restricted to works with an extreme degree
of complexity and high values. These types of work are excluded from our analysis.
5 Art. 24 of law 109/1994 introduced the 300,000 euro (converted from Italian liras by the authors)
threshold giving objective necessary conditions to run restricted auctions. Before this law, in Italy, public
administration could run restricted auctions under general circumstances assessed directly by the public
administration running the auction. It is plausible that the introduction of this law, reflected the intention
of the policy maker of limiting the amount of discretion available to public administrations. The law was
passed after a period of corruption scandals in public procurement, discussed in Coviello and Gagliarducci
(2015). According to this law, the manipulation of the project value or the division of work into sub-lots
to avoid the 300,000 euro threshold are illegal practices.
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300,000 euros, the public buyer can use the Trattativa Privata under two less extreme
circumstances: there should be a particular technical contingency or some emergency
reasons; or previous procedures were run with no adjudication of the works. Also, below
the threshold, the public buyer does not need to formally report to the Italian Authority for
Public Procurement on the use of Trattativa Privata. The Trattativa Privata encompasses
a wide spectrum of procedures in which the public buyer has a varying degree of flexibility
in the invitation of the bidders. Above 300,000 euros, the Trattativa Privata consists of a
two-step procedure. First the public buyer has to invite at least 15 firms to an informal
auction.6 Then, the public buyer can negotiate the terms of the contract with the firm
proposing the best offer. The procedure becomes binding for the public buyer once the
contract is signed.7 Below 300,000 euros, the public buyer can follow the same procedure
explained above, however in this case the public buyer is legally required to invite at least
5 firms.8 As an alternative, the public buyer can negotiate directly with one or more firms.
However the latter alternative is not frequent in our data, therefore we will consider the
observed Trattativa Privata as a restricted auction and not a direct negotiation.9
The procurement law determines entry requirements, which are a function of the value
of the project, regardless of the auction format. For example, if the maintenance of a
municipal school is put out to tender and the public buyer estimates that the amount of
work that has to be done is valued at 600,000 euros, the required category will be 3-OG1,
where 3 refers to the size of the works and OG1 to the category “civic and industrial
building constructions”. Firms certified for 3-OG1 projects are allowed to bid for projects
with a reserve price of at most 650,000 euros. After the inspection of the procurement
law, we conclude that entry requirements associated with firms’ financial characteristics
do not jump discontinuously at the 300,000 euro threshold.
The applicable procurement law during our sample period requires auctions to be
sealed-bid and single-attribute (i.e., technical and quality components of the offers are not
6The limit is not binding whenever the nature of the project does not allow 15 firms to be identified.
7Conversely, the result of a Pubblico Incanto or Licitazione Privata is already legally binding for the
public buyer.
8In this case the limit is binding.
9 We inspected the number of bidders and the number of invitees for Trattativa Privata in our sample,
and more than 80% of them have enough bidders to be safely considered restricted auctions. In Section
6.4, we repeat our RDD analysis dropping from our sample direct negotiations and auctions with fewer
than 5 invited firms and find that results do not change.
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part of the bids and are pre-specified by the public buyer before the auction takes place).10
The firms participating in the auctions submit a percentage reduction (a rebate) with
respect to the project value. The rebate that wins the auction determines the reduction
from the original reserve price, and therefore, the price paid by the public buyer to the
winning contractor to undertake the procured project.
In our main database, the winner of the auction is determined by a mathematical
algorithm illustrated in Figure 1.11 After a preliminary trimming of the top/bottom 10%
of the collected rebates, the rebates that exceed the average by more than the average
deviation (called the “anomaly threshold”) are also excluded. The winning rebate is the
highest of the non-excluded rebates (that are below the anomaly threshold).12 In our
sample, the auction mechanism is constant across treated and control works and it should
not interfere in our study of the increased discretion in the form of an increased ability to
select, and therefore also exclude, participants.13
The auction mechanism in our data is somewhat unconventional, as it has some “beauty
contest” features whereby the highest bidder does not necessarily win. The specific features
of the mechanism raise the theoretical possibility that increased participation need not
result in greater competition (Albano et al. 2006, and Decarolis, 2014). If so, then a
10During the period covered by our 2000-2005 sample, Italian public administrations had to follow
“Legge Merloni”: Legge 109/94 and amendments (“Merloni-bis” in 1995, “Merloni-ter” in 1998, and
“Merloni-quater” in 2002). Major legislative changes were introduced in 2006, but do not affect our
sample. These changes are used in Decarolis (2014) to identify the effects of the auction mechanism on
outcomes.
11 This mechanism is not used in three sets of procurement works. First, auctions with a reserve
price above the European Community threshold that are administrated under the European Community
common law, “Merloni-quater” in 2002. Second, the municipality and the province of Turin managed
to change the procurement law and from the 2003 introduced first-price auctions. Third, the algorithm
does not apply when fewer than 5 bidders participate in the procedure. To keep the auction mechanism
constant in our data, we: a) discard EU auctions from the data, to avoid the comparison of outcomes
across auctions administrated with different rules; and b) assess the robustness of results to the exclusion
of/restriction to the sample of the province and municipality of Turin that run first-price auctions.
12As an illustration, consider this simple example. In a hypothetical auction, after the trimming of
the tails there are three participants placing the following bids (in the form of a rebate over the starting
value): 10%, 14% and 16%. The average bid is thus 13.33%. The average difference of the bids above this
average bid is 1.67%. Thus the “anomaly threshold” is 15.%. It turns out that in this case the winning
bid is 14%, which is above the average, even if 16% is the highest bidden rebate.
13These algorithms are more common than one would expect. In the US, the Florida DoT and the New
York State Procurement Agency have used them. They are also present in procurement regulation in
many countries including Chile, China, Colombia, Italy, Japan, Peru, Malaysia, Switzerland and Taiwan.
Their theoretical properties have been studied by Albano et al. (2006), Decarolis (2014) and Chang et al.
(2015), who also test their results in the lab.
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reduction in discretion need not have any effect on the cost of procurement, although
the possibility to exclude poor past performers that comes with increased discretion may
still potentially affect procurement outcomes. Therefore, the evidence on the effects of
discretion on auction outcomes would not be easy to extrapolate to contexts with more
standard auction formats, where increased participation is usually associated with higher
competition. However, Conley and Decarolis (2015) show theoretically that in such an
auction, increased participation may indeed result in more aggressive bidding, because of
competition among cartels and independent bidders. This theoretical result is consistent
with Figure 2 in the paper, which documents a positive and significant relationship between
the number of bidders and the rebates submitted by these bidders, in our data.14 The
same dataset is used in Coviello and Mariniello (2014) to study the effects of an exogenous
increase in publicity (i.e., potential competition), where it is found that the higher number
of potential participants is indeed associated with larger discounts.15 Taken together,
the theory and evidence suggest that, despite the fact that the auction mechanism is
unconventional, lower participation is pejorative for the auctioneer as in a conventional
auction.
Contractual conditions (e.g., deadlines and the possibility of subcontracts) are de-
scribed in the call for tender. Some terms of the contract (the date of delivery of the
works and the cost of the project) might be partially renegotiated in cases of unforeseen
or extreme meteorological events.16 Subcontracting part of the works is permitted by law,
but requires the approval of the public administration.
Each auction is administered by a manager, who is directly appointed among the
bureaucrats working in the public administration. The manager supervises the whole
procurement process, which entails the following duties: preparing the preliminary project,
14 We find a similar positive and significant relationship between the number of bidders and the winning
rebate (the maximum rebate) in a (small) sub-sample of first-price auctions managed by the municipality
and province of Turin from the 2003. In Section 6.4 we repeat all our RDD analysis in this sub-sample
for the sake of robustness.
15Chang et al. (2015) run an experimental analysis of the empirical bidding functions in average bid
auctions, which are similar to the Italian auctions. They show that bidding functions are statistically
indistinguishable from the empirical bidding functions in first-price auctions. This paper also shows
that the average bid mechanism performs quite well at reducing the price paid by the auctioneer as in
conventional first-price auctions.
16Floods, storms, earthquakes, landslides, and mistakes by the engineer are the reasons for renegotia-
tions prescribed by the Italian Civil Code.
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advertising the call for tender, administering the auction, paying the winning firm, and
monitoring the realization of the work. The manager of the auction also sends all the
information regarding the auction to the Italian Authority for Public Procurement. The
Authority checks, among other things, the quality of the provided information, and collects
the information in its database, which we use in this paper. As discussed in Coviello
and Gagliarducci (2015), a corrupt auction manager might under-report or report the
information on ex post renegotiations as missing in order to favor local contractors and to
get bribes.
4 Data and Sample Selection
We exploit a unique administrative database collected by the Italian Authority for the
Surveillance of Public Procurement (AVCP). We gained access to all the public works
awarded in Italy between 2000 and 2005 with a project value greater than or equal to
150,000 euros. For each contract, we observe the number of bidders, the winner’s rebate,
the project value, the identity and the type of the winning bidder, the type of work,
the date of contractual and official/effective delivery of the works, the final costs for the
public administration running the auction as well as its type (i.e., municipalities, provinces,
regions, hospital, universities) and geographical location.
Contractual and effective dates of delivery of the works and total costs, allow us to
compute measures of ex post renegotiations. In the analysis, we consider as outcome
the variable Work Length, which is the number of days from the first day of work until
the effective end of the project. We also consider the variable Delay that represents the
difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline.
We will consider these measures as main outcomes of our regressions. In the robustness
section, we also consider as an outcome the ratio between the delay and the effective
duration of the procurement process. The information regarding final costs for the buyer
allow us to construct a measure of Cost Overrun, which we compute as the ratio between
the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the
winning rebate). These measures are used to proxy performance of the procurement
process.17
17 Our dataset does not allow to track works over time (i.e., after the works are delivered to the public
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The identity of winning bidders allows us to construct a measure of firms’ incumbency.
For each auction, we define the winner as Incumbent winner if it has won at least one other
auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction. This measure is
constructed using winners of auctions held between 2001 and 2005.18 Our database also
contains information on the size of the firms winning the auctions. In the analysis, we
consider as an outcome the variable S.R.L., which is a dummy for a limited liability firm
as the winner. The database also contains information on the geographical origin or the
firms winning the auctions. With this information, we use as an outcome the variable
Local Winner, which is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same
province of the public buyer. Further, we integrate this data with demographic information
(ISTAT) and measures of social capital (Guiso et al., 2004), corruption (Golden and Picci,
2005) and judicial system efficiency.19
From the original dataset, we make a first selection of a sub-sample of works with a
project value between 200,000 and 500,000 euros. We do this to rule out discontinuities
in auction outcomes induced by other regulatory thresholds at a project value of 200,000
and 500,000 euros.20 We keep all the observations for which we observe all the outcomes
of interest (i.e., the number of bidders, the winning rebate, etc.). Data on the number of
bidders, the winning rebate and the identity of the winning company contain a limited
amount of missing values, whereas data on ex post renegotiations contain more missing
values. This data might be systematically under-reported in high corruption areas, and
this under-reporting might be more severe for auctions with Trattativa Privata.21
Second, we focus on the building construction sector. This sub-sample has the prop-
administration). This lack of information renders it impossible to build a measure, at auction level, that
allows to assess, albeit indirectly, the quality of the works from the frequency of the interventions/repairs.
18 In Section 6.4 we check the robustness of our results by repeating our RDD analysis in this sub-sample
of auctions.
19We use population and length of civil trial per year at the provincial level. Guiso et al. (2004) consider
two measures of social capital based on the blood donation and referendum turnout; in our analysis we
use the latter. Golden and Picci (2005) quantify corruption as the difference between the actual quantities
of public infrastructures and the price paid to accumulate that stock of capital.
20Public buyers can award works below 200,000 euros using the Cottimo Fiduciaro, a procedure that
allows a higher degree of discretion. For works above 500,000 euros, the public buyer has to comply with
additional publicity requirements, see Coviello and Mariniello (2014) for details on this policy. We also
drop the public buyers from five special status regions (out of 20) that have special procurement laws.
21 As a robustness check of our main results, in Section 6.4, we repeat our RDD analysis without this
sample selection.
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erty that it shows no sorting of the project value around the discontinuity threshold.22
Finally, a key decision in implementing the RDD method is the choice of the bandwidth
around the discontinuity threshold. Following the routine developed in Imbens and Kalya-
naraman (2012), for each of the auction outcomes, we compute the estimates of the effects
of discretion in the sub-sample of auctions with a value within the interval around the
threshold determined by the optimal bandwidth selection criterion.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1, we report the summary statistics for the sample of public works with a project
value between 200,000 and 500,000 euros. The data base amounts to 3,362 public works.
8% of these works are awarded with Trattativa Privata. The average project size is 316,000
euros. 62% of the works are managed by municipalities, and 10% by provinces. 61% of
the works are located in the north of Italy. This is comparable with the distribution of
the population and of public administrations in Italy.23
In Table 2, we report descriptive statistics by type of award mechanism and project
value. The probability of having a Trattativa Privata is higher below 300,000 euros: 12% of
works, compared to 3% above 300,000 euros. The number of bidders is lower for Trattativa
Privata and it increases for high-value works. The distribution of the number of bidders is
more skewed for open auctions. The winning rebate is lower for Trattativa Privata. Also,
the distribution of the rebates looks more skewed for open auctions. Projects awarded
with Trattativa Privata seem to be delivered faster than open auctions, however they also
seem to be subjected to longer delays in relation to the contracted deadline, especially
works above the threshold. This can be rationalized by the procedure requiring a certain
degree of urgency in the execution of the works. Cost overrun differs by a small margin.
Winners in Trattativa Privata are more frequently local firms, and this effect appears to be
22 We use the McCrary (2008) and Lee (2008) tests, explained in details in Section 6.1, to drop from
our analysis the sample of roads works. This is because these projects show bunching (a discrete jump) of
the running variable around the 300,000 euro threshold. This jump violates the assumptions underlying
the RDD, making the estimates obtained from this sample not informative on the causal effect of running
a restricted auction on auction outcomes. Section 5 clarifies the importance of this requirement.
23 This distribution is comparable with the distribution of the population in Italy (46% North, 30%
Center, 24% South). Regarding the distribution of public administrations in Italy we are aware of 8,050
municipalities, 1,233 hospitals, 110 provinces, 20 regions, and 68 universities. This distribution is compat-
ible with the evidence of Table 1 showing that the majority of works are managed by Italian municipalities.
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stronger for projects with a value below the threshold. Incumbent firms are more likely to
win a Trattativa Privata, regardless of the project size. Winning companies are more likely
to be limited liability companies for works adjudicated with Trattativa Privata, whereas
winning companies are less likely to be limited liability companies for works adjudicated
with Trattativa Privata below the 300,000 euro threshold.
5 Regression Discontinuity Design
In Section 3, we discussed that projects with a value (i.e., a reserve price) below the
300,000 euro threshold are more likely, by law, to be adjudicated by Trattativa Privata,
whereas projects with a value above the threshold are more likely to be awarded through
open auctions. This specific feature of the procurement law allows us to estimate the
effect of discretion in procurement using the RDD methodology (Hahn et al., 2001; Im-
bens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The economic intuition of the RDD
method is that estimates are obtained by comparing auctions which, in terms of value, are
immediately above or below the 300,000 euro discontinuity threshold. These two groups
of auctions are likely to have different discretion levels, but should otherwise be identi-
cal in terms of observable (e.g., entry-requirements) and unobservable (e.g., complexity)
characteristics.
The central assumptions of RDD are as follows:
1. The forcing variable (the project value) is continuously distributed around the thresh-
old (no-sorting).
2. The probability of being treated (use of Trattativa Privata) changes discontinuously
at the threshold.
3. In the absence of treatment, the expected outcome changes continuously around the
threshold (continuity assumption).
Hahn et al. (2001) show that, depending on additional assumptions, RDD nonpara-
metrically identifies several types of expected treatment effects. Specifically, under the
assumptions that (1) for each observation, treatment assignment is some monotone de-
terministic function of the forcing variable (the function can be different for different
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observations); (2) the forcing variable crossing the discontinuity threshold cannot impact
outcomes except through impacting the treatment (i.e., valid exclusion restriction, see Lee
and Lemieux, 2010); and (3) the random effect of treatment and treatment assignment
function are jointly independent of the forcing variable around the threshold then RDD
nonparametrically identifies the local average treatment effect for compliers (LATE) at
the threshold.24
In this paper we denote with Ti the Trattativa Privata variable. Specifically, Ti = 1 if
the project is managed as a Trattativa Privata (i.e., a restricted auction), Ti = 0 otherwise.
Let Yi be the project value, y0 be the threshold value, and Oi denote one of the procurement
outcomes. Then, the LATE of Trattativa Privata for works at the threshold is identified
by
lim
e↓0
E(Oi|Yi = y0 + e)− E(Oi|Yi = y0 − e)
E(Ti|Yi = y0 + e)− E(Ti|Yi = y0 − e) .
(1)
When the denominator in (1) is exactly one (perfect compliance), the design is said to
be sharp. If it is less than one, the design is said to be fuzzy. In this paper, we have a case
of Fuzzy-RDD as the contracting authorities have some flexibility in deciding the works
that are assigned with Trattativa Privata (see Section 3).
The numerator and the denominator of equation (1) are usually called the intention-to-
treat (ITT) effects. As discussed in Lee and Lemieux (2010), they are: (a) derived without
relying on a valid exclusion restriction; and (b) informative of the average treatment effect
(ATE) of Zi = 1{(Yi − y0) ≥ 0} on the treatment Ti and on the procurement outcomes
Oi. Under the continuity assumption of the starting value around the threshold (and of
the unobservables), the ITT are unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect (ATE)
of change in the ability to use Trattativa Privata on procurement outcomes.
5.1 Implementation of the RDD with Regressions
Hahn et al. (2001) recommend using nonparametric (kernel) local linear regressions when
estimating the conditional expectations in (1). However, it is also a common practice to
24These assumptions allow for endogenous selection into treatment based on anticipated gains from
treatment (i.e., non-compliance). At the same time, in view of the continuity assumption, the populations
on different sides of the threshold (near the threshold) must be identical except for the likelihood of being
treated.
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use for estimation parametric linear models augmented with a flexible control function in
g(Yi − y0) that is typically approximated by a polynomial. The latter approach consists
of estimating a traditional IV-LATE regression model where the endogenous variable Ti
is instrumented by Zi = 1{(Yi − y0) ≥ 0}, and the first and second stages include the
same continuous control functions in g(Yi − y0).25 Van der Klaauw (2002) shows that
the parametric approach allows all the data in the discontinuity sample to be used and
variations coming from work that are not close to the threshold to be absorbed using the
flexible controls for the starting value, g(Yi − y0).
We start by presenting parametric linear models augmented with a flexible control
function in g(Yi − y0) used in Angrist and Lavy (1999) and recently surveyed in Lee and
Lemieux (2010). We IV-LATE estimate equation (2) with the two-stage least squares
method.
Oi = g(Yi − y0) + βTi + ηXi + ωi. (2)
In the first-stage, equation (3), we consider Zi = 1{(Yi − y0) ≥ 0} as the excluded
instrument for Ti
Ti = g(Yi − y0) + γZi + αXi + νi. (3)
Where, g(Yi − y0) is approximated with a third-order polynomial in (Yi − y0). The Xi
in the baseline model includes just a set of five year dummies.
Throughout the paper, we also report OLS estimates of equation (2) considering Ti =
Zi = 1{(Yi−y0) ≥ 0}. These estimates are OLS estimates of the intention-to-treat effects,
which we denote OLS-ITT. Because of the legislative framework, we expect these OLS-
ITT to be diluted estimates and to represent a lower bound of the true treatment effect
(see Angrist, 2005).
6 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present our empirical analysis based on the RDD, the main results, and
a number of robustness checks.
25See Angrist and Lavy (1999), Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Van der Klaauw (2002).
18
6.1 Testing the continuity assumption in the pre-treament vari-
ables and in the running variable
Compliance with the continuity assumption is a necessary condition to obtain correct
estimates of the causal effect of discretion in the RDD framework. We use two graphical
methods to inspect the continuity assumption: McCrary (2008) and Lee (2008). These
two methods are in some ways complementary.
Figure 3, is a histogram of the starting value of the auction around the Trattativa Pri-
vata threshold. The figure suggests no sorting around the threshold. We then follow Mc-
Crary (2008) and formally test for this possibility. First, we draw a very under-smoothed
histogram of the running variable distribution. The bins are defined such that no bin will
include points on the left and the right side of the threshold. Second, we run a local linear
smoothing of the histogram. The midpoints of the histogram are the regressors and the
normalized counts of the number of observations are the outcomes variables. Figure 4
shows that there is no sorting or manipulation of the running variable around the thresh-
old.26 In Table 3 we report the parametric version of the McCrary (2008) test, which
confirms our graphical evidence of no sorting of the starting value of the auctions around
the Trattativa Privata in the construction sector.27
Lee (2008) suggests an alternative procedure to investigate the continuity condition
analyzing the behavior of the pretreatment variables around the threshold. We define a set
of pretreatment variables from the information available. A pretreatment variable should
respect two conditions: it should not be affected by the level of treatment, and it may
depend on the unobservable that should affect the procurement outcomes. Identification
would not be possible in case of jumps in the distribution of the pretreatment variables,
since the project assigned to Trattativa Privata Zh would not be comparable with the work
not assigned to Trattativa Privata Zl. We use a number of different variables regarding the
identity and the location of the contracting authorities, such as being in the north, in the
26 Figure A.1 reports estimates of the McCrary(2008) test by North, Center, and South super-regions
of Italy. This figure confirms that there is no sorting of the running variable around the discontinuity
threshold in the most corrupt areas (i.e., the South) of Italy.
27 Figure B.1, and Table B.1 reproduce the RDD analysis on the road works sample. Figure B.1 shows
that in this sample there is sorting of the running variable around the threshold. This jump in the starting
value of the auctions violates the assumptions underlying the RDD, which cannot be used to infer about
the causal effect of discretion (McCrary, 2008).
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city of Rome, or in Piedmont, or being either a municipality or province. We also control
for other variables observed at the provincial level such as population, length of civil trial,
corruption and social capital. In Figure 5, we plot non-parametric estimates of our set
of pretreatment variables against yd = (Y − y0), the distance of the project value from
the cut-off point. First, we draw the mean of the pretreatment variable over a fine grid.
Then, we estimate separately on the left and on the right of the threshold three different
approximations: a linear regression (solid line), a local polynomial regression (dot-dashed
line) and a running-mean smooth estimator (dashed line). This figure suggests that there is
no substantial evidence of sorting in pretreatment variables other than the municipality.28
This evidence shows that the RDD assumptions are satisfied and that there is no perfect
manipulation of the value of the auction (the reserve price that determines exposure to
treatment) around the discontinuity. We conclude, therefore, that discretion is quasi-
experimentally assigned around the threshold.
6.2 Graphical Analysis
In this section, we report graphical evidence of the change in contracting authorities’
discretion on our variables of interest. Figure 6 reports graphical evidence around the
Trattativa Privata threshold. This figure is constructed with the same procedure described
in section 6.1 to compute Figure 5.
Our graphical evidence is that (First) authorities use Trattativa Privata more when
they can. Second, effective work length seems to be shorter when there is more discretion,
whereas we find no discontinuous change in the measure of delay in the delivery of the
works, below and above the threshold. Third, incumbent firms seem more likely to win
below the 300,000 euro threshold. Fourth, we have weak evidence of a positive effect
of discretion on the frequency of S.R.L.-type (i.e., limited liability company) winners.
Finally, there seems to be no evidence of effects of increased discretion on rebates, number
of bidders, cost overrun or local winner.
28 In Table A.1 we run a parametric version of this test following the same approach described in Section
5.1 for the procurement outcomes. Our evidence suggests that there is no sorting in the majority of these
pretreatment variables.
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6.3 Parametric Analysis
In this section, we report the results of the parametric analysis on the outcomes of interest.
Table 4 reports the estimates and the standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) of
the empirical model discussed in Section 5.1 on the sample selected using the optimal
bandwidth procedure, as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The first panel
reports the ITT estimates, the second reports instead the results for the Fuzzy-RDD
estimates. The bottom three rows report the average in the estimation sample, the size
of the optimal bandwidth and the sample size.
We first discuss the results on the use of Trattativa Privata. Column 1 reports the esti-
mated coefficient for the Trattativa Privata. We find a positive and statistically significant
increase (+17.4%) in the use of Trattativa Privata for works with a starting value below
the 300,000 euro threshold. This suggests that contracting authorities use more discretion
when allowed and do comply with the procurement law. In the absence of this discrete
jump, our evidence would indicate a violation of Assumption 2 of the RDD discussed in
Section 5.
Columns 2 and 3 report the estimated coefficients for the ex ante outcomes of the
procurement process we observe, the winning rebate and the number of bidders. The co-
efficients are not statistically significant in either ITT or Fuzzy-RDD for both the winning
rebate and the number of bidders. We should note that the coefficient for the number of
bidders has the expected negative sign. These results suggest that the limited increase in
discretion we study has no sizeable effect on entry and direct costs of the public works.
Columns 4 to 6 display the estimated coefficients when we consider ex post outcomes of
the procurement process: effective work length, days of delay, and cost overrun. Looking
at the ITT estimates, we observe that the increase in discretion seems to induce an increase
in the days of delay. On average, works below the threshold have 30 days more of delay;
this accounts for about 22% of the average number of days of delay. Fuzzy-RDD estimates,
however, do not confirm these results; the estimated coefficient is negative although not
statistically significant. Also, we find a negative but not statistically significant effect of
increased discretion on the effective length of the work. We do not find any statistically
significant evidence on cost overrun.
The last three columns focus on the identity of the winning firm: local winner, incum-
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bent winner and S.R.L. (i.e., limited liability company). We do not find any statistically
significant evidence on selection of local or limited liability firms. Focusing on column 8
instead we find a statistically significant effect on the probability that an incumbent firm
wins the contract. ITT (Fuzzy-RDD) estimated effects are +8.4% (+44%). This effect is
sizeable given that, on average, incumbent firms win 9.6% of the time.29
Overall, our RDD analysis seems to suggest that contracting authorities exploit the
increased discretion by using more Trattativa Privata. The increased discretion does not
directly affect entry or the winning rebate (i.e., the direct costs of procurement). There is
contrasting evidence on the ex post performance side: longer delays but no difference in
effective work length. There seems instead to be a selection based on the type of bidder.
Incumbent firms are more likely to win repeated contracts.
6.4 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we consider nine possible concerns of the apparently discontinuous rela-
tionship between auction outcomes and discretion.
First, in Table 5, we repeat our analysis approximating g(Yi − y0) (henceforth g(yd))
with a linear, quadratic and quartic polynomial specifications of the starting value of the
auction. In Table A.2 we approximate g(yd) with local linear regressions that include a
linear term in the starting value of the auction, its interaction with the indicator for works
above the threshold and the indicator for works above the threshold. These estimates have
the advantage of allowing heterogenous effects of g(yd) for contracts below and above the
300,000 euro threshold. Our evidence is that contracting authorities systematically use
more discretion by using Trattativa Privata more often for contracts with a value below the
threshold compared to contracts above the threshold, and that the effect of discretion on
incumbency is positive and statistically significant across all the specifications of g(yd).
30 In
29We test this result with different specifications, considering the number of times the firm has won in
the past, and different time lags of two and three years. These results are available on request.
30 As discussed in Section 4 the variable “Incumbent winner” is defined for the sub-sample of auctions
held between 2001-2005. This data limitation opens the possibility that the estimates on other outcomes
are different in this sub-sample of auctions. In Tables A.3 and A.4 we have replicated our analysis in
the 2001-2005 sub-sample, and considered the baseline model with year fixed effects and the model with
region-year (interactions) fixed effects for all the specifications of g(yd). The estimates obtained from this
table are comparable in sign, magnitude and statistical significance to the estimates obtained using the
2000-2005 sample.
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the rest of our robustness checks, which we discuss below, we report the evidence obtained
by approximating g(yd) with a linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic polynomial specifications
of the starting value of the auction, and local linear regressions. The sensitivity of the
RDD estimates to the specification of the polynomial of the running variable g(yd) are
discussed by Gelman and Imbens (2014). In this paper, they show that RDD estimates
are sensitive to high-order specification of g(yd), and low-order specification of g(yd) and
local linear regression are preferable specifications to approximate g(yd) to estimate the
causal effect of interest.
Second, in Table A.5 we extend our baseline model adding controls for region and year
fixed effects. In Table A.6 we add as controls region-year (interactions) fixed effects, in
Table A.7 we include 110 province and year fixed effects, and in Table A.8 we include 1,517
contracting authority fixed effects. In Table A.2 (Panels B-D) we report evidence from
local linear regressions parametrization of g(yd) for the three different specifications of time
and geographical controls. Our results are robust to different specifications of geographical
factors and time controls. To directly control for the impact of specific institutional factors,
we repeat our analysis adding as a control in our regression measures of corruption, social
capital and judicial inefficiency. To do so, we estimate our baseline model adding as a
control a corruption index (Golden and Picci, 2005), a social capital index (Guiso et al.,
2004) and a judicial inefficiency index.31 Table 6 reports the estimated coefficient for ITT
and Fuzzy-RDD controlling for our measures of institutional quality. Table A.9 replicates
the same analysis but considering local linear regressions. Our main conclusion is that the
effects of discretion are robust to the inclusion of institutional and geographical factors
that could have explained both the use of discretion and auction outcomes.32
Third, we expand the set of controls included in the vector Xi (of equations 2 and
3) to inspect the possible effects of works heterogeneity. In Table A.10 and Table A.11
we repeat our analysis including 8 indicator variables for the categories of the works.
31The length of civil trials, our measure of judicial inefficiency varies across years and provinces, and
it allows us to estimate a model that includes 110 province fixed effect and year effects. Corruption
and social capital, however, are time-invariant measures observed at provincial level and allow us to only
include year fixed effects in our regressions.
32 The estimated coefficient of corruption (Column 1, panel B of Table 6 and Table A.9) is negative and
statistically significant, and indicates that an increase in corruption is negatively associated with the use of
discretion. This correlation confirms the intuition that public administrations are perhaps underutilizing
discretion because they are limited by the law.
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These 8 dummies summarize 80% of the distribution of the works. Table A.10 reports the
estimates obtained from including these 8 dummies to the baseline model. In Table A.11,
we control for the categories of the works and for region-year (interaction) fixed effects.
The evidence suggests that works observed heterogeneity and the geographical location of
the public buyers running the auctions do not affect our main estimates. In Table A.12 we
also include region-year (interactions) fixed effects, time-fixed effects, works-fixed effects,
and an indicator for judicial efficiency, to our baseline model. Our evidence is similar to
the evidence obtained with the baseline model. A remark: the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of these controls indicates that there is randomization of the treatment
across different geographical regions, years, and observable characteristics.
Fourth, we test the sensitivity of our results to different bandwidth specifications and
sample selection. Figure 7 plots the estimated coefficients for the ITT effects (and 90%
confidence interval) obtained by estimating our baseline model in different subsamples
around the 300,000 euro threshold. Each subsample considers auctions with a value around
the threshold that ranges from 5,000 to 100,000 euros, with increments of 2,500 euros. In
the picture, the horizontal line represents zero, and the vertical line represents the optimal
bandwidth determined using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure.33 The
effects on the use of Trattativa Privata and incumbency are positive and significant across
the different bandwidths below and above the optimal bandwidth. For works with a
value in an interval smaller than the one determined by the optimal bandwidth, discretion
appears to reduce the contractual work length; to result in the selection of larger (S.R.L.
incorporated) firms; and to reduce the number of firms submitting bids. Other outcomes,
like the winning rebate, cost overrun and the probability that the project is awarded to a
local firm, are not significantly affected by the degree of discretion.
Fifth, we assess the robustness of the results for the outcome Delay. Figure 6 shows
that the variable Delay has no jumps around the 300,000 euro threshold and therefore the
parametric estimates do not pass the graphical inspection of the possible jump around
the threshold. Regarding the model specification, rows 1, 2 and 4, 5 of Table 5 show that
the effects of discretion on the variable Delay are negative and not statistically significant.
33 Figure A.2 plots the same estimates but considering a model with regional-year (interacted) fixed
effects. Figure A.3 (A.4) plots the estimates for the local linear regressions (with regional-year interaction
terms).
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Panel A of Table A.2 reports the local linear regression estimates of the effects of discretion
on delays (and on all the other outcomes). The evidence from Table A.2 confirms that
discretion has no effect on Delay, as in the graphical analysis. That is, by reducing the
order of the polynomial specification we get no effects on the variable Delay. This evidence
is compatible with the econometric discussion in Gelman and Imbens (2014) that shows
why high-order polynomials regressions should be interpreted more carefully relative to
low-order polynomial regressions and local linear regressions. These results are robust
to different specification of geographical and time effects (Panels B-D of Table A.2, and
Tables A.5-A.11). Regarding sample selection, Figure 7 shows that the effect of discretion
on Delay (obtained with third-order polynomial regressions) are not robust if we change
the bandwidth around the 300,000 euro threshold, since 10% confidence intervals include
the zero. We find similar evidence in Figures A.2-A.4. Our main conclusion is that the
positive effects of discretion on the delays in the delivery of the works are sensitive to
graphical inspection, variations of model specification and sample selection.34
Sixth, we also look at the robustness of the effects of discretion on the overall length
of the work, defined as the number of days from the awarding date until the effective date
of delivery of the work. The variable that reports the overall duration of the procurement
process might capture the interruptions caused by appeals in courts, of which we do
not have direct information in our database. If restricted auctions are systematically
challenged during the procurement process, then the overall duration of the procurement
process should be longer in these auctions. In Table A.14 we repeat our RDD analysis
considering as a dependent variable the overall length of the procurement process for the
work. Table A.14 suggests that the procurement process is not systematically longer in
restricted auctions.
Seventh, in Section 4 we discussed that our main estimates are obtained selecting
the subsample of auctions for which we observe all the outcomes of interest. Table A.15
replicates our analysis without this sample selection. Our results are comparable in sign,
magnitude and statistical significance to our main estimates.35 Moreover, in Section 3 we
34 We have also estimated the effect of discretion on the ratio between the number of the days of delay
and the contractual length of the works, defined as the number of days from the first day of work until
the contractual deadline. Table A.13 shows, as for the outcome delays, that discretion has no effects on
this variable when we consider low order specifications of g(yd).
35 In Tables A.16-A.18, we replicate our analysis dropping direct negotiations and auctions with fewer
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discussed that the measures of ex post quality in the execution of the contract might be
systematically under-reported in high corruption areas, and that under-reporting might
be more severe in restricted auctions. We tackle this possible issue in two ways. First,
we replicate our analysis by looking at the auctions held in the less corrupt areas of Italy.
Table A.19 replicates the main results for the North-Center regions of Italy, which are less
corrupt. This table suggests that our main evidence in the sample of less corrupt public
administrations is similar to the evidence obtained in the main sample. Second, we repeat
our RDD analysis in the main sample, considering as a dependent variables the probability
that the information on ex post renegotiations (effective work length, delays, and cost
overrun) and on incumbent winners is missing. These variables, however, are informative
if corrupt auctioneers do not report systematically the info on ex post renegotiations and
the identity of the incumbent winners, whereas are not if they under-report it. Table A.20
reports evidence that this information on ex post renegotiations (Panel A) and incumbent
winners (Panel B) is not systematically missing in restricted auctions.
Eighth, to assess the robustness of these (local) results around the threshold, we run
two placebo tests. We generate two simulated treatments at two different values of the
starting value of the auctions: 250,000 and 450,000 euros instead of 300,000 euros. We
then use these thresholds to statistically test for the presence of discontinuities in the
outcomes in two samples separated by the 300,000 euro threshold (i.e, below the threshold
and above the threshold). Tables A.21 and A.22 report estimates obtained estimating our
baseline model. We (1) do not find evidence of significant effects in the large majority
of the two simulated thresholds; and (2) report evidence of very weak instruments in the
Fuzzy-RDD estimates (see Marmer et al., 2015). This evidence reassures us about the
robustness of our results, as it indicates that they are not driven by random chance or by
other thresholds.
Ninth, does discretion matter in more commonplace auctions formats? We empirically
test this possibility by analyzing a small sub-sample of first-price auctions available in
our data. We use the auction data collected by the municipality and province of Turin,
which voluntary switched to first-price auctions starting from January 2003. Decarolis
than 5 invited firms (see discussion in Section 3, footnote 9). These tables suggest that our evidence in
this sub-sample is similar in sign, magnitude and significance to the evidence obtained in the full sample.
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(2014) and Branzoli and Decarolis (2015) explain the details of this reform. Within this
sub-sample we repeat our RDD analysis. In Table A.23 we report descriptive statistics for
the sub-sample of 221 first-price auctions for public works. The average number of bidders
per auction is 17.08, and the mean winning rebate is 28.6%. In this (small) sub-sample we
find a positive and statistically significant correlation between the number of bidders and
the winning rebate, as in our main sample. To gain sample size, we run our RDD analysis
in the sample of auctions with starting values between 200,000 and 500,000 euros, but we
do not drop auctions that have missing values in some outcomes (see above discussion)
and we consider all type of works. In Table A.23 we present estimation results. Panel A
displays simple correlations, Panel B reports a model that controls for a linear term in
the value of the project, whereas Panel C add as controls categories FEs. The estimates
are comparable in sign and in magnitude to those obtained in the main sample, although
they are somewhat less significant given the smaller sample size. This evidence is a form
of replication of the third type (the most important), discussed by Levitt and List (2009)
or Al-Ubaydli and List (2015), which helps to generalize our main results because we are
using a different design and a new treatment where the type of open auction is different.
7 Incumbency and Performance
Our RDD analysis delivers some clear evidence on how contracting authorities use in-
creased discretion. Below the threshold we observe an increase in the use of Trattativa
Privata and in the probability of having an incumbent winner, relative to above the thresh-
old. Other ex ante and ex post auction outcomes appear not to be directly affected by
increased discretion. It is important to notice that our RDD analysis is not informative of
the effects of exogenous variations in incumbency on auction outcomes. This is because
estimate the impact of incumbency on auctions outcomes requires exogenous variations in
incumbency that do not directly affect auction outcomes. Our RD design does not provide
such variations.
In this section we explore the correlations between repeated wins by incumbent con-
tractors, and their past and future performance measured by the delays in the delivery
of the works. To do so, we first analyze the correlation between performance in the exe-
cution of the current works and being an incumbent winning firm. Then, we analyze the
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correlation between past firms’ performance and the probability of winning in the current
auction.
In Table 7, we analyze how winners’ incumbency affects the ex post efficiency of the
execution of the contract. To address the possible endogeneity of winners’ incumbency,
we implement three estimation strategies. First, we exploit the longitudinal nature of
the data. We estimate the impact of winner incumbency on ex post efficiency of the
execution of the contract controlling for FE at provincial and year level. Second, we use a
propensity score matching estimator to estimate the causal effect of being an incumbent
firm. The estimator generates causal estimates of this effect by matching the observable
characteristics of incumbent winners with those of non-incumbent winners.36 Third, we
implement a re-weighting propensity score matching estimator. This matching estimator
differs from the previous matching estimator because it uses the estimated propensity
score as a weight for the estimates. A complete exposition of the method is presented
in Di Nardo et al. (1996) and Brunel and Di Nardo (2004). Table 7 splits our original
sample in auctions above and below 300,000 euros separately (and for auctions with a value
chosen with the optimal bandwidth used in the previous sections). Our main result is that
incumbent winners that are likely to be selected with discretionary procedures deliver
works with less delay. In the full sample this effect is larger and statistically significant
in the sample of works below the 300,000 euro threshold. The difference persists once we
use the optimal bandwidth sample, however, in this case, the coefficients of incumbency
are not statistical different from zero.37 This evidence suggests that when public buyers
select incumbent firms, performance does not worsen; indeed, it may improve on average.
In Table 8, we re-organize the data and construct for each public buyer a panel of
potential incumbents. For each year, we define as (a potential) incumbent any firm that
has won a contract with a specific public buyer in the previous year. Then, for each of
these potential incumbents, we measure the average number of days of delay in the delivery
36We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and use 4 matching neighbours and estimate the average
treatment on the treated (ATT).
37 We use as controls provincial fixed effects, year fixed effects, a cubic polynomial in the project value,
number of bidders, effective work length and winning rebate. We test different specifications, the effect
of incumbency is robust across them. We also perform the same analysis using the effective length of
the work as the dependent variable, finding similar results. In Table A.24 we also repeat the analysis
considering a specification that includes year and region fixed effects and their interaction terms.
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of the adjudicated works. Finally, we regress this measure on the probability of winning a
work in the current year. To evaluate the impact of discretion, we repeat this regression by
splitting the sample above and below the 300,000 euro threshold (and within the optimal
bandwidth). The evidence from Table 8 suggests that for works below the 300,000 euro
threshold, there is a negative and statistically significant effect of past delay (measured in
hundreds of days) on the probability of winning a contract. In contrast, for works above
the threshold, that are more often adjudicated with open auctions, the effect is smaller
and not statistically significant.38 This evidence suggests that contracting authorities
select incumbent firms, when allowed by the procurement law (i.e., for contracts below
the threshold), that had better performed in the past.
We conclude that the results obtained from Table 7 and Table 8 are suggestive of the
fact that increased discretion is predominantly used to select incumbents that delivered
with less delay in the past and that incumbent firms tend also to have better performance
today (i.e., lower delay) when executing public works. These estimates, however, have
two main limitations. First, the matching estimates need more stringent assumptions
compared to our main RDD analysis in order to be defined as causal. Second, in the
potential incumbent panel, the size of the estimated effects is rather small, which can be
explained by the fact that in our data we observe only the winner’s identity and not the
participants in the auctions, and therefore our estimate cannot fully quantify the impact
of buyers’ discretion in the selection process.
8 Conclusion
Economists have broadly recognized the benefits of open auctions. In government procure-
ment, the merits of open auctions typically exceed their mere pro-competitive effects. The
extreme transparency of the mechanism has attracted national and international policy
makers who want to limit government discretion and its abuse. The benefits come at a
cost, however, because open auctions are typically more complicated and costly to run.
38The effect is robust to various specifications. In Table 8, we report the results for two specifications.
In the first we control for contracting authorities fixed effects, year fixed effects and a cubic polynomial in
project size. In the second specification we also add controls for the public buyer experience, as number
of works awarded in the past year. In Table A.25 we repeat the analysis considering a specification that
includes year and region interaction terms.
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Furthermore, recent literature on transaction costs and contract theory has pointed out
other important limitations of open auctions: in the presence of transaction costs and
incomplete enforcement and contracting, open auctions may not perform well, especially
for complex transactions, because they are rigid and remove all discretion from the buyer.
Understanding which of these two conflicting effects of discretion - both of which are likely
to be relevant to some degree – dominates in the environment we are studying is therefore
an empirical question.
In this paper, we measure the effects of the increase in buyer discretion linked to the use
of restricted procurement auctions- in terms of increased ability to select participants- by
running a regression discontinuity analysis (RDD). We exploit a threshold present in the
Italian procurement law that quasi-experimentally increases the ability of the contracting
authorities to use restricted auctions, a mechanism whereby buyers have discretion over
who (not) to invite to bid. Works above this threshold are almost inevitably awarded
through open auctions; works below this threshold can be awarded through restricted
auctions between a set of invited participants. Our identification strategy relies on the
assumption that within a small interval around the threshold, contracts will be otherwise
identical in terms of observable (e.g., entry-requirements) and unobservable (e.g., com-
plexity) characteristics. Differences in procurement outcomes will then identify the causal
effects of increased discretion.
We find that increased discretion leads to a significant increase in the probability that
the same firm is awarded a project repeatedly by the same buyer. To our knowledge, we
are the first to quantify this causal effects of discretion. By itself, however, this result
can either signal the presence of productive relational contracts, or of corrupt buyer-seller
relations, or just an attempt to reduce set-up costs.
With the aid of more data on other procurement outcomes we rationalize this finding,
concluding that discretion need not deteriorate the overall functioning of the procurement
process since it does not affect standard ex ante auction outcomes (number of bidders,
rebates, size of the winners, distance from the public buyer) or in most of our ex post
measures of renegotiations (i.e., duration of the works; and monetary renegotiations). We
find some evidence that discretion has a positive effect on delays, that turns out not to be
robust. In a closer neighbourhood of the discontinuity threshold, we find evidence that the
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positive effects of discretion may dominate negative ones. Discretion appears to reduce
the total duration of the works; to lead to the selection of larger (incorporated) firms,
which have typically better quality control systems; and to reduce the number of firms
submitting bids, saving administrative costs associated to bid screening. Other outcomes
like the winning rebate, cost overrun, and the probability that the project is awarded to
a local firm, are not significantly affected by the degree of discretion.
In the interpretation of our evidence, one might be concerned that discretion increases
the number of repeated wins by incumbent contractors but reduces the unobserved quality
of delivered works because of corrupt preferential relationships between public buyers and
favored contractors. We explore this possibility by looking at two additional pieces of evi-
dence. First, we repeat our RDD analysis controlling for geographical location, corruption,
social capital and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running the auctions.
Our evidence suggests that the effects of discretion we identified are robust to the inclu-
sion of these institutional factors as controls. Second, we explore the relationship between
projects’ past and future delays in delivery and winners’ past and future incumbency. We
find that contractors that have won in the past systematically deliver current works faster.
In addition, contractors characterized by better past performance are more likely to win
current auctions. These correlations suggests that positive productive relationships may
dominate negative corrupt relationships in our sample.
Our overall evidence suggests that discretion increases the number of repeated wins by
contractors and need not result in worse overall functioning of public procurement. Indeed,
we have some evidence, albeit not causal, of a small positive effect of discretion. Taken
together, these results are coherent with the conclusions of Banfield (1975) and Kelman
(1990), who claim that some discretion, even at the risk of a reduction in accountability (in
the absence of ex post performance monitoring), may be necessary to achieve good public
management. They are also consistent with the findings of Bandiera et al. (2009), that
the amount of (passive) waste linked to red tape and other inefficiencies is considerably
larger than (active) waste from corruption in the procurement of goods and services in
Italy, and that overall waste is considerably smaller when the purchasing authority is
more autonomous and therefore enjoys somewhat more discretion. This is not to say that
discretion is not often misused in many instances of public procurement, including those we
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are studying in this paper. Our results show that, in our data, the effects of the productive
use of discretion appear to dominate the unproductive use of discretion, so that the stricter
accountability rules that apply above the threshold may not have been welfare-increasing
in this procurement market. However, we are sure that the misuse of discretion is present
in many instances in our data, even though our controls do not seem to capture it, and
we conjecture that if corruption could be fought effectively with instruments other than
reduced buyer discretion and rigidity of procedures, the effect of increased buyer discretion
would be even stronger. The complex interaction between accountability rules and the
productive and unproductive use of discretion in organizations remains, in our view, an
exciting and important issue in great need of further research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES mean sd p50 N
Outcomes
Trattativa Privata 0.077 0.267 0 3,362
N. Bidders 15.22 19.46 9 3,362
Winning Rebate 12.89 7.301 12.45 3,362
Work Length 392.6 195.7 360 3,362
Days of Delay 142.1 142.2 109 3,362
Cost Overrun 0.137 0.178 0.0835 3,362
Local Winner 0.562 0.496 1 3,362
Incumbent Winner 0.105 0.306 0 2,914
S.R.L. 0.471 0.499 0 2,763
Characteristics
Project Value (in 100,000 euro) 3.167 0.846 2.974 3,362
Province 0.096 0.294 0 3,362
Municipality 0.621 0.485 1 3,362
Population (in 1,000) 1,087 1,078 636.4 3,362
Corruption Index 1.074 0.927 0.824 3,329
Lenght Civil Trial (in days) 871.2 292.9 826 3,362
Social Capital Index 0.841 0.0577 0.860 3,362
North 0.613 0.487 1 3,362
Center 0.257 0.437 0 3,362
South 0.130 0.336 0 3,362
Note: Trattativa Privata is a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure. Winning
Rebate is the percentage discount over the reserve price. Work Length is the number of days from the first day
of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works. Delay is the
difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is the ratio
between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and
the awarding cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the
public buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm has won a contract with the public
buyer in the past year. S.R.L is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Population
is the number of residents at the provincial level (in 1,000). Corruption index is the Golden-Picci Index (2005)
defined as the difference between the actual quantities of public infrastructures and the priced paid to accumulate
that stock of capital. Social Capital Index is the Guiso et al. (2004) measure based on referendum turnout.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5],
in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Comparison across Threshold
VARIABLES mean sd p50 N mean sd p50 N
Below 300,00 euros
No Trattativa Privata Yes Trattativa Privata
N. Bidders 14.60 17.59 9 1,520 3.176 2.415 3 204
Winning Rebate 13.11 7.347 12.51 1,520 8.680 6.938 6.815 204
Work Length 354.4 174.6 325.5 1,520 313.3 186.7 283 204
Days of Delay 128.2 130.3 98 1,520 127.5 139.9 97 204
Cost Overrun 0.133 0.184 0.0801 1,520 0.148 0.178 0.0914 204
Local Bidders 0.572 0.495 1 1,520 0.691 0.463 1 204
Incumbent Winner 0.0998 0.300 0 1,313 0.200 0.401 0 185
S.R.L. 0.468 0.499 0 1,253 0.449 0.499 0 178
Above 300,00 euros
No Trattativa Privata Yes Trattativa Privata
N. Bidders 17.76 21.84 11 1,583 4.273 3.297 4 55
Winning Rebate 13.38 7.124 12.83 1,583 7.996 5.643 7.060 55
Work Length 438.6 203.8 406 1,583 417.7 227.1 364 55
Days of Delay 156.5 150.1 120 1,583 164.8 183.4 121 55
Cost Overrun 0.138 0.173 0.0857 1,583 0.144 0.155 0.0912 55
Local Bidders 0.536 0.499 1 1,583 0.564 0.501 1 55
Incumbent Winner 0.0962 0.295 0 1,372 0.114 0.321 0 44
S.R.L. 0.474 0.500 0 1,281 0.529 0.504 1 51
Notes: Trattativa Privata is a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure. Winning Rebate is
the percentage discount over the reserve price. Work Length the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end
of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works. Delay is the difference in days between the effective end of
the project and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost
(reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning
firm is located in the same province of the public buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won
at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction. S.R.L is a dummy equal to one if the
winning firm is a limited liability firm.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000
euros (2005 equivalents).
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Table 3: McCrary Discontinuity Test
All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Discontinuity -0.154 -0.194 0.146 -0.185 -0.253 -0.282 -0.549*
(SE) (0.131) (0.300) (0.252) (0.237) (0.237) (0.262) (0.322)
Notes: The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold (in 100,000 euros).
Rows 1 and 2 report the Coefficient and Standard Errors of the of the Discontinuity Test according to McCrary (2008).
Column 1 reports the result for the Full Sample. Columns 2 through 5 report the results from 2000 and 2005. Significance at
the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in
100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Table 4: Baseline Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Len. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
ITT 0.174*** 0.0530 -2.764 -13.53 29.97* -0.00953 0.0145 0.0839** 0.0675
(0.0367) (0.586) (1.935) (20.51) (16.60) (0.0209) (0.0560) (0.0377) (0.0742)
Fuzzy-RDD 0.389 -17.22 -78.21 174.8 -0.0562 0.0929 0.440** 0.373
(4.308) (11.85) (117.3) (109.2) (0.125) (0.358) (0.209) (0.430)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include a cubic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years
2000-2005. Rows 1 and 2 report the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros (ITT effects),
Rows 3 and 4 report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros as
instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate,
the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project,
which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the
ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the
winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer
within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports
the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table 5: Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis: Polynomial Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention to Treat
Linear 0.142*** -0.144 -0.914 -18.02 -7.453 0.00972 -0.00351 0.0505* 0.0978*
(0.0270) (0.463) (1.491) (15.90) (12.91) (0.0154) (0.0418) (0.0280) (0.0560)
Quadratic 0.129*** -0.240 -0.617 -11.69 -6.037 0.00957 0.000143 0.0478* 0.0926
(0.0249) (0.513) (1.532) (16.40) (12.91) (0.0156) (0.0429) (0.0275) (0.0570)
Quartic 0.164*** -0.678 -2.377 -3.762 34.07** -0.00665 0.0199 0.0897** 0.0647
(0.0344) (0.701) (1.996) (21.06) (16.56) (0.0214) (0.0571) (0.0372) (0.0754)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.254 -6.702 -126.6 -47.56 0.0711 -0.0249 0.330* 0.556
(4.021) (10.75) (111.5) (82.39) (0.112) (0.296) (0.186) (0.343)
Quadratic -1.764 -4.835 -90.43 -42.37 0.0758 0.00109 0.335* 0.594
(3.732) (11.87) (126.3) (90.69) (0.123) (0.325) (0.197) (0.391)
Quartic -4.535 -16.19 -23.01 200.8* -0.0419 0.139 0.505** 0.357
(4.661) (13.38) (128.3) (111.4) (0.136) (0.398) (0.226) (0.431)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [quartic] polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and
Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. The Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] and 2 (4) [6], reports the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable
equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros (ITT effects). The Panel B, rows 7 (9) [11] and 8 (10) [12], reports estimates of IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes
(Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata,
a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in
column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in
days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted
by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent
Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if
the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth
calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted
for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
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Table 6: Controlling for Corruption, Social Capital and Judicial Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Social Capital
ITT 0.173*** -0.0174 -2.262 -12.77 29.92* -0.00757 0.0199 0.0858** 0.0684
(0.0366) (0.513) (1.916) (20.39) (16.51) (0.0206) (0.0557) (0.0376) (0.0739)
Social Capital 0.366*** -71.64*** -105.0*** -281.3*** -133.3** -0.484*** -0.952*** 0.372*** 0.524**
(0.0745) (2.338) (7.953) (67.66) (55.10) (0.0916) (0.168) (0.108) (0.231)
Fuzzy-RDD -0.127 -14.24 -74.21 174.3 -0.0451 0.129 0.445** 0.377
(3.745) (11.84) (117.4) (108.3) (0.124) (0.360) (0.207) (0.428)
Social Capital -71.59*** -99.70*** -254.1*** -197.0*** -0.466*** -1.000*** 0.193 0.408
(2.634) (9.338) (81.52) (70.49) (0.103) (0.215) (0.137) (0.269)
Panel B: Corruption
ITT 0.173*** -0.248 -2.997 -13.02 29.13* -0.0104 0.00928 0.0882** 0.0717
(0.0367) (0.535) (1.924) (20.56) (16.66) (0.0208) (0.0559) (0.0378) (0.0744)
Corruption -0.0115** 3.677*** 5.518*** 1.505 -1.156 0.0228** 0.0435*** -0.00505 0.0457***
(0.00492) (0.138) (0.650) (5.278) (4.099) (0.00900) (0.0105) (0.00775) (0.0159)
Fuzzy-RDD -1.848 -18.73 -75.65 167.6 -0.0612 0.0597 0.462** 0.391
(3.951) (11.83) (118.2) (107.2) (0.126) (0.359) (0.211) (0.427)
Corruption 3.651*** 5.273*** 0.629 0.505 0.0221** 0.0443*** -0.000761 0.0479***
(0.142) (0.669) (5.421) (4.336) (0.00936) (0.0114) (0.00805) (0.0164)
Panel C: Judicial Efficiency
ITT 0.161*** -0.0872 -2.093 -18.54 28.77* -0.00497 0.0182 0.0933** 0.0867
(0.0365) (0.421) (1.764) (20.36) (16.35) (0.0204) (0.0524) (0.0382) (0.0740)
Length Civil Trial 0.00369 -0.0906 0.170 1.340 -3.501 0.00194 -0.0134 -0.00348 -0.00907
(0.00492) (0.0851) (0.365) (3.710) (3.182) (0.00364) (0.00892) (0.00667) (0.0121)
Fuzzy-RDD -0.663 -14.10 -115.6 178.5 -0.0315 0.128 0.496** 0.502
(3.183) (11.57) (126.5) (114.6) (0.130) (0.368) (0.220) (0.466)
Length Civil Trial -0.0901 0.177 1.748 -4.311 0.00204 -0.0134 -0.00552 -0.00931
(0.0843) (0.357) (3.680) (3.446) (0.00363) (0.00886) (0.00738) (0.0129)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include a cubic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years
2000-2005. Panel A (B) [C] includes control for Social Capital index (Corruption index) [Length of civil trial]. Rows 1 (9) [17] and 2 (10) [18] report the regression of the outcomes on an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros (ITT effects); rows 3 (11) [19] and 4 (12) [20] report the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the Social Capital index (Corruption
index) [Length of civil trial]. Rows 5 (13) [21] and 6 (14) [22] the IV-LATE estimates of IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator
variable equal to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD); rows 7 (15) [23] and 8 (16) [24] report the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the Social Capital index
(Corruption index) [Length of civil trial]. The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2,
Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end
of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost
Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal
to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the
same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average
reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects
of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
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Table 7: Incumbency and Contract Execution: Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Delay Delay Delay Delay Delay Delay
MODEL FE PSM RW FE PSM RW
Full Sample
Below 300,000 euro Above 300,000 euro
Incumbent Winner -21.35** -19.82* -22.25** -3.828 -2.586 -2.276
(9.739) (11.24) (9.163) (12.33) (14.29) (11.87)
Observations 1,292 1,292 1,292 1,094 1,094 1,094
Optimal Bandwidth
Below 300,000 euro Above 300,000 euro
Incumbent Winner -13.91 -10 -13.45 -11.57 -7.886 -8.669
(11.99) (13.26) (10.53) (17.42) (20.99) (15.32)
Observations 913 913 913 409 409 409
Notes: The table reports the effect of incumbency, defined as a dummy equal to one if the winning firm has won a contract with
the public buyer in the past year in the last year, on days of delay, defined as the difference in days between the end of the
project and the contractual deadline. Columns 1 through 3 report the results for the public works below 300,000 euros. Columns
4 through 6 report the results for the public works above 300,000 euros. Column 1 and 4 report the results of model including
Fixed Effect for each province and year (110 province and years 2000-2005) and controls for the reserve price (cubic polynomial),
number of bidders, contractual length, dummy for Trattativa Privata and winning rebate. Column 2 and 5 report the results for
a Propensity Score Matching model; the project are matched using a propensity score on the reserve price (cubic polynomial),
number of bidders, contractual length, dummy for Trattativa Privata, winning rebate and Fixed Effect for each province and
year (110 province and years 2000-2005). Column 3 and 6 report the results for a Propensity Score Reweigthing model; the
propensity score is constructed as in the Propensity Score Matching model. Observations reports the number of observations.
Standard Errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Source:
Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro
(2005 equivalents).
43
Table 8: Incumbency and Past Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Win Win Win Win
Full Sample
Below 300,000 Above 300,000
Average Delay -0.00199*** -0.00200*** -0.000839 -0.000849
(0.000605) (0.000605) (0.000539) (0.000538)
Observations 11,079 11,079 12,008 12,008
Optimal Bandwidth
Below 300,000 Above 300,000
Average Delay -0.00215*** -0.00215*** -0.00105 -0.00105
(0.000731) (0.000731) (0.000962) (0.000961)
Observations 8,658 8,658 5,485 5,485
Notes: The table reports the effect of past performance, defined as the average number of days of delay in work
executed in the previous year by the incumbent firm, on the probability of winning a auction today. The dependent
variable is an indicator equal to one if the incumbent firm have win an auction today. Panel A (B) reports the
results on the full sample (Optimal Bandwidth sample, calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
procedure). Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the public works below 300,000 euros. Columns 3 through 4
reports the results for the public works above 300,000 euros. Columns 1 and 3 report the results of a model including
as control contracting authority fixed effect, year fixed effect and project value (cubic polynomial). Columns 2 and
4 report the results of a model that add as additional control the contracting authority experience, defined as the
number of works awarded in the past year. Observations reports the number of observations. Standard Errors are
clustered at contracting authority level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Source:
Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with project value y ∈ [2, 5], in
100,000 euro.
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Figure 1: The Awarding Mechanism
Notes. Ravg is the average rebate, expressed as a percentage reduction form the starting value. T, is the anomaly threshold obtained as the sum of Ravg and
the average deviation of the bids above Ravg . Rwin is the winning rebate and is the max rebate below T. Rmin and RMax the minimum and the maximum
rebate, respectively.
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Figure 2: Rebates, Number of Bidders and Discretion
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Notes: Distribution of the rebates conditional on the number of bidders participating to the auction at different levels of discretion: high (in red) or low (in blue). Circles
denote the minimum rebate; triangles the winning rebate; diamonds the maximum rebate. Vertical lines denote the 95% confidence intervals. Source: Statistics for all
the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure 3: Overall Distribution of the Auctions Reserve Price
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
en
si
ty
−1 0 1 2
Dist. from the discontinuity, in 100000 euro
Notes: The running variable is the difference between reservation price and the
300,000 euro threshold (red vertical line).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000
and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
Figure 4: Discontinuity Test of Auctions Reserve Price Around the Threshold
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
−2 −1 0 1 2
Dist. from the discontinuity, in 100000 euro
Notes: The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000
euro threshold (vertical line). Circles are average observed values, the bold solid line is a
kernel estimate (see McCrary, 2008), and the two thin lines are 95% confidence intervals.
In this overall sample the McCrary (2008) discontinuity test (standard error) is -.15 (.13),
and suggests that the null hypothesis of no sorting cannot be rejected at standard statistical
confidence levels.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with
auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure 5: Pretreatment Graphical Analysis
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Notes: North is a dummy for work assigned warded in the North of Italy. Population is the number of residents at the provincial level (in 1,000). Corruption
index is the Golden-Picci Index (2005) defined as the difference between the actual quantities of public infrastructures and the priced paid to accumulate that
stock of capital. Social Capital Index is the Guiso et al. (2004) measure based on referendum turnout. The running variable is the difference between the
reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold. Circles represent sample averages of the dependent variable computed on 30,000 euros brackets of the running
variable. The solid line is a linear estimate. The dot-dashed line is a local polynomial estimate. The dashed line is a running-mean smooth estimate. The red
vertical line denotes the discontinuity, normalized to zero.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure 6: Graphical Analysis: Outcomes
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Notes: Trattativa Privata is a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure. Winning Rebate is the percentage discount over the reserve price. Work
Length the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works. Delay is the difference in days between
the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the
winning rebate) and the awarding cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy
equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction. S.R.L is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a
limited liability firm.
The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold. Circles represent sample averages of the dependent variable computed on 30,000 euros
brackets of the running variable. The solid line is a linear estimate. The dot-dashed line is a local polynomial estimate. The dashed line is a running-mean smooth estimate. The red
vertical line denotes the discontinuity, normalized to zero.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure 7: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths
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Notes: The graph report estimates for discretion from regressions, which estimates polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects
for years 2000-2005. The bold solid line reports point estimates at different bandwidths of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros
(ITT effects), and the two thin lines are 90% confidence intervals. The vertical line denotes the optimal bandwidth computed using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure,
and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth.. Trattativa Privata is a dummy equal to one for works assigned with
a more discretionary procedure. Winning Rebate is the percentage discount over the reserve price. Work Length the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of
the project, which represent the effective duration of the works. Delay is the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is
the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one
if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the
same buyer within a year from the current auction. S.R.L is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Appendix A
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Table A.1: Pretreatment Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables North Pop. Piedmont Municipality Province Rome Jud. Eff. Corruption Soc. Cap.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.0578 54.80 -0.0149 -0.0812** -0.00657 -0.00902 -36.24 0.0307 6.13e-06
(0.0439) (89.22) (0.0274) (0.0378) (0.0204) (0.0109) (25.35) (0.0700) (0.00471)
Quadratic 0.0513 52.05 -0.0157 -0.0723* -0.00346 -0.00942 -29.39 0.0373 0.00144
(0.0448) (90.98) (0.0280) (0.0385) (0.0213) (0.0112) (25.94) (0.0726) (0.00487)
Cubic 0.0161 64.30 0.000817 -0.0556 0.00425 -0.00839 -7.597 0.0524 0.00581
(0.0589) (122.4) (0.0370) (0.0505) (0.0264) (0.0155) (33.39) (0.0923) (0.00637)
Quartic 0.00664 41.75 -0.00282 -0.0611 -0.0121 -0.00693 -5.441 0.0409 0.00553
(0.0599) (124.8) (0.0377) (0.0510) (0.0296) (0.0159) (34.15) (0.0935) (0.00649)
LLR 0.0527 46.46 -0.0170 -0.0749* -0.00555 -0.00955 -29.90 0.0345 0.00132
(0.0448) (90.87) (0.0280) (0.0384) (0.0207) (0.0113) (25.90) (0.0723) (0.00485)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear 0.407 404.7 -0.107 -0.586** -0.0531 -0.0665 -251.8 0.228 4.55e-05
(0.316) (657.9) (0.197) (0.282) (0.164) (0.0819) (180.0) (0.522) (0.0349)
Quadratic 0.400 416.8 -0.118 -0.546* -0.0253 -0.0747 -225.5 0.288 0.0112
(0.355) (727.9) (0.209) (0.297) (0.155) (0.0904) (201.8) (0.563) (0.0376)
Cubic 0.0933 391.2 0.00554 -0.378 0.0319 -0.0486 -44.28 0.343 0.0368
(0.340) (737.4) (0.250) (0.348) (0.198) (0.0906) (193.7) (0.606) (0.0406)
Quartic 0.0407 273.0 -0.0203 -0.434 -0.0802 -0.0430 -33.42 0.301 0.0386
(0.366) (810.0) (0.271) (0.367) (0.195) (0.0991) (208.9) (0.689) (0.0454)
LLR 0.391 445.0 -0.0757 -0.602** -0.0306 -0.0460 -287.3* 0.171 -0.0130
(0.281) (601.9) (0.187) (0.269) (0.151) (0.0707) (161.1) (0.502) (0.0331)
Observations 2,042 2,323 2,649 2,685 3,176 2,139 2,008 2,437 2,545
Average 0.600 1052 0.132 0.631 0.0970 0.0150 876 1.050 0.842
Bandwidth 0.737 0.838 0.975 0.999 1.600 0.770 0.724 0.888 0.919
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 400,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} and 2 (4) [6] {8}, report the estimates of the
Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT
effects). Panel B, rows 9 (11) [13] {15} and 8 (10) [12] {16} report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata),
which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). The dependent variables are: in column
1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount
over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end
of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and
the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by
the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the
public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within
a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number
of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs
are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and we include only municipality, province and region to allow clustering at region level.
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Table A.2: Local Linear Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Baseline Model
ITT 0.127*** -0.242 -0.580 -10.37 -5.442 0.0104 0.000630 0.0479* 0.0940*
(0.0246) (0.488) (1.521) (16.28) (12.88) (0.0155) (0.0427) (0.0273) (0.0569)
Fuzzy-RDD -2.134 -5.992 -145.9 -62.35 0.0692 -0.0254 0.329* 0.449
(3.702) (11.37) (109.4) (75.44) (0.112) (0.296) (0.187) (0.304)
Panel B: Region and Year Fixed Effect
ITT 0.123*** -0.284 -0.961 -5.448 -2.622 0.0115 -0.00979 0.0490** 0.0903
(0.0239) (0.358) (1.259) (13.98) (10.17) (0.0154) (0.0464) (0.0219) (0.0590)
Fuzzy-RDD -2.392 -8.319 -109.3 -45.18 0.0809 -0.0946 0.348* 0.418
(2.394) (8.613) (82.62) (88.28) (0.122) (0.336) (0.173) (0.373)
Panel C: Region-Year Fixed Effect
ITT 0.124*** -0.215 -1.259 -11.25 -4.675 0.0123 -0.00804 0.0443** 0.0949
(0.0255) (0.376) (1.384) (12.18) (10.48) (0.0137) (0.0480) (0.0196) (0.0626)
Fuzzy-RDD -1.787 -10.49 -145.4* -60.73 0.0886 -0.0844 0.314* 0.394
(2.607) (10.08) (75.35) (90.14) (0.108) (0.340) (0.153) (0.399)
Panel D: Province and Year Fixed Effect
ITT 0.119*** -0.181 -0.536 -6.458 1.271 0.0118 0.0104 0.0553** 0.103
(0.0277) (0.413) (1.189) (13.76) (10.91) (0.0157) (0.0407) (0.0238) (0.0630)
Fuzzy-RDD -1.481 -4.876 -101.2 -21.07 0.0912 0.0748 0.409** 0.534
(2.406) (11.08) (119.6) (86.13) (0.115) (0.307) (0.199) (0.364)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from local linear regressions, which includes the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000
euro threshold and an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion. The Panel A (B) [C] {D} regressions include Fixed
Effects for years 2000-2005 (Fixed Effect for each region and year, 20 regions and years 2000-2005)[Fixed Effect for each couple of region-year,
20 regions and years 2000-2005]{Fixed Effect for each province and year, 110 province and years 2000-2005}. Rows 1 (5) [9] {13} and 2 (6) [10]
{14} report the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price
is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects), Rows 3 (7) [11] {15} and 4 (8) [12] {16} the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes
(Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument and the interaction between
this variable the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). The dependent variables are: in
column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the
percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of
work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between
the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and
the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if
the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that
has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if
the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent
variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate
the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (clustered at
region level) [clustered at region level] {clustered at province level}. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the construction procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005
equivalents). The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal
bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.3: Baseline Model - Sample 2001-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.170*** -0.617 -1.779 -2.988 -9.325 0.00336 0.0364 0.0505* 0.0948*
(0.0305) (0.649) (1.350) (18.71) (12.19) (0.0153) (0.0359) (0.0280) (0.0576)
Quadratic 0.156*** -0.476 -1.685 7.892 -7.538 0.00263 0.0262 0.0479* 0.102*
(0.0284) (0.652) (1.391) (19.41) (12.53) (0.0152) (0.0386) (0.0275) (0.0585)
Cubic 0.182*** -0.315 -2.657 -22.25 9.309 0.00232 0.0347 0.0841** 0.103
(0.0420) (0.872) (1.659) (23.72) (15.65) (0.0207) (0.0456) (0.0377) (0.0765)
Quartic 0.174*** -0.309 -2.479 -21.53 8.935 0.00818 0.0277 0.0898** 0.0876
(0.0399) (0.880) (1.681) (24.57) (15.92) (0.0210) (0.0534) (0.0373) (0.0776)
LLR 0.154*** -0.515 -1.600 7.985 -7.406 0.00379 0.0292 0.0479* 0.0994*
(0.0280) (0.653) (1.391) (19.31) (12.43) (0.0151) (0.0371) (0.0273) (0.0585)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -3.961 -11.95 -18.03 -58.88 0.0224 0.290 0.330* 0.521
(4.121) (8.854) (112.5) (77.33) (0.102) (0.286) (0.186) (0.337)
Quadratic -3.286 -11.73 51.90 -51.60 0.0187 0.180 0.335* 0.623
(4.468) (9.484) (129.2) (86.07) (0.108) (0.264) (0.197) (0.383)
Cubic -1.729 -16.44 -114.5 49.51 0.0124 0.232 0.441** 0.532
(4.770) (10.03) (120.7) (84.49) (0.111) (0.304) (0.209) (0.428)
Quartic -1.826 -15.81 -116.5 51.21 0.0477 0.167 0.506** 0.474
(5.179) (10.49) (131.7) (92.35) (0.121) (0.319) (0.227) (0.443)
LLR -4.052 -11.52 -67.44 -61.11 0.0234 0.179 0.328* 0.371
(4.065) (9.475) (132.6) (75.00) (0.103) (0.264) (0.187) (0.322)
Observations 1,614 1,936 2,354 1,488 1,815 1,974 2,836 1,848 1,252
Average 0.0905 12.76 14.00 376.4 135.8 0.134 0.559 0.0958 0.494
Bandwidth 0.670 0.812 1.035 0.620 0.761 0.831 1.762 0.773 0.617
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve
price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect years 2000-2005.| Panel
A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an
indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|,
report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price
is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned
with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in
column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the
works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio
between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local
Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to
one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal
to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm.Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent
variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects
of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the
5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2001 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works executed in 2000 are dropped.
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Table A.4: Region-Year Fixed Effects Model - Sample 2001-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.167*** -0.493 -2.427 -12.09 -11.68 0.000727 0.0305 0.0484** 0.0918
(0.0296) (0.364) (1.503) (14.47) (11.68) (0.0180) (0.0359) (0.0212) (0.0718)
Quadratic 0.153*** -0.428 -2.372 -0.829 -8.887 -0.000888 0.0190 0.0445** 0.0991
(0.0290) (0.354) (1.622) (16.36) (11.21) (0.0150) (0.0364) (0.0200) (0.0695)
Cubic 0.186*** -0.361 -2.700* -25.45 5.948 -0.00154 0.0219 0.0855** 0.121
(0.0507) (0.575) (1.305) (27.01) (15.84) (0.0259) (0.0414) (0.0349) (0.123)
Quartic 0.178*** -0.392 -2.631* -25.18 6.047 0.00431 0.0174 0.0907** 0.110
(0.0465) (0.527) (1.285) (28.87) (15.33) (0.0257) (0.0556) (0.0368) (0.125)
LLR 0.152*** -0.453 -2.317 -1.187 -8.829 0.000251 0.0231 0.0444** 0.0974
(0.0282) (0.344) (1.601) (16.37) (11.25) (0.0150) (0.0365) (0.0196) (0.0691)
Panel B; Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -3.174 -16.63 -72.80 -74.74 0.00486 0.246 0.315* 0.513
(2.358) (9.866) (86.03) (81.43) (0.119) (0.280) (0.153) (0.452)
Quadratic -2.960 -16.82 -5.406 -61.80 -0.00630 0.132 0.310* 0.613
(2.304) (11.14) (106.6) (80.90) (0.107) (0.247) (0.155) (0.495)
Cubic -2.019 -16.62* -129.6 31.82 -0.00839 0.145 0.457* 0.626
(3.245) (8.923) (127.0) (87.35) (0.142) (0.270) (0.221) (0.735)
Quartic -2.367 -16.67* -136.6 34.63 0.0259 0.105 0.521* 0.602
(3.221) (8.782) (143.7) (90.32) (0.151) (0.334) (0.246) (0.774)
LLR -3.170 -16.79 -112.1 -74.76 0.00412 0.146 0.316* 0.388
(2.420) (11.28) (104.8) (78.39) (0.117) (0.242) (0.153) (0.418)
Observations 1,614 1,936 2,354 1,488 1,815 1,974 2,836 1,848 1,252
Average 0.0905 12.76 14.00 376.4 135.8 0.134 0.559 0.0958 0.494
Bandwidth 0.670 0.812 1.035 0.620 0.761 0.831 1.762 0.773 0.617
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear regressions (LLR)
include the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion
and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of
the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro
(ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes
(Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables
are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the
percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work
until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective
end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve
price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the
same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the
same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations
reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this
bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2001 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works executed in 2000 are dropped.
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Table A.5: Region and Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.138*** -0.210 -1.159 -12.89 -4.515 0.0106 -0.0135 0.0519** 0.0925
(0.0271) (0.397) (1.095) (12.95) (11.44) (0.0170) (0.0438) (0.0227) (0.0597)
Quadratic 0.126*** -0.324 -1.041 -6.703 -3.124 0.0106 -0.0113 0.0487** 0.0886
(0.0250) (0.357) (1.262) (13.69) (10.10) (0.0153) (0.0464) (0.0222) (0.0596)
Cubic 0.171*** -0.260 -2.559** -12.32 30.98** -0.00878 0.00203 0.0887** 0.0651
(0.0400) (0.457) (1.045) (21.21) (13.07) (0.0277) (0.0714) (0.0349) (0.0633)
Quartic 0.161*** -0.534 -2.069 -2.919 34.69** -0.00634 0.0115 0.0954** 0.0646
(0.0362) (0.428) (1.306) (23.09) (13.92) (0.0286) (0.0708) (0.0364) (0.0598)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.849 -8.700 -92.93 -29.56 0.0804 -0.0979 0.348* 0.540
(3.363) (8.192) (94.99) (76.35) (0.124) (0.326) (0.169) (0.422)
Quadratic -2.431 -8.324 -53.16 -22.44 0.0869 -0.0876 0.350* 0.585
(2.555) (9.859) (108.5) (73.21) (0.122) (0.367) (0.178) (0.464)
Cubic -1.943 -16.33** -72.33 185.4* -0.0528 0.0134 0.464* 0.367
(3.373) (6.404) (122.9) (86.47) (0.171) (0.470) (0.219) (0.387)
Quartic -3.674 -14.51 -18.20 212.0** -0.0406 0.0835 0.532** 0.366
(3.044) (8.268) (143.6) (92.92) (0.186) (0.505) (0.242) (0.369)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000
euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region and year (20 regions and years 2000-2005). Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} and 2 (4) [6] {8}, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs
(in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 9 (11) [13] {15} and 8
(10) [12] {16}, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below
300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure;
in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of
work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and
the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the
awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal
to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning
firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth
calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth.
SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is
smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
56
Table A.6: Region-Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.139*** -0.161 -1.424 -19.90* -7.154 0.0116 -0.0121 0.0483** 0.0947
(0.0284) (0.408) (1.241) (10.88) (11.93) (0.0161) (0.0450) (0.0212) (0.0634)
Quadratic 0.126*** -0.242 -1.345 -12.26 -5.164 0.0116 -0.00928 0.0443** 0.0932
(0.0266) (0.376) (1.396) (11.86) (10.47) (0.0137) (0.0480) (0.0200) (0.0637)
Cubic 0.178*** -0.217 -3.185*** -13.99 32.46** -0.00331 0.00631 0.0855** 0.0714
(0.0413) (0.464) (0.892) (19.96) (14.04) (0.0269) (0.0730) (0.0349) (0.0649)
Quartic 0.167*** -0.540 -2.659** -4.549 36.57** -0.000729 0.0151 0.0906** 0.0692
(0.0371) (0.431) (0.977) (22.21) (14.40) (0.0277) (0.0718) (0.0366) (0.0607)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.424 -10.68 -142.3 -45.00 0.0851 -0.0872 0.314* 0.538
(3.509) (9.461) (87.49) (78.52) (0.113) (0.332) (0.153) (0.438)
Quadratic -1.826 -10.64 -96.90 -35.90 0.0922 -0.0711 0.309* 0.603
(2.753) (11.00) (97.52) (74.77) (0.104) (0.374) (0.155) (0.490)
Cubic -1.596 -19.65*** -78.37 189.0* -0.0197 0.0404 0.458* 0.393
(3.377) (6.189) (111.4) (94.81) (0.161) (0.464) (0.221) (0.387)
Quartic -3.646 -18.26** -27.02 214.6** -0.00465 0.107 0.521* 0.379
(3.005) (6.446) (131.8) (97.79) (0.177) (0.498) (0.246) (0.358)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000
euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} and 2 (4) [6] {8}, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs
(in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 9 (11) [13] {15} and 8
(10) [12] {16} report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below
300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure;
in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of
work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and
the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the
awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal
to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning
firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth
calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth.
SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is
smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.7: Province Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.133*** -0.157 -0.666 -14.02 -1.039 0.0107 0.00925 0.0585** 0.104**
(0.0314) (0.333) (1.402) (15.72) (13.61) (0.0153) (0.0393) (0.0269) (0.0446)
Quadratic 0.122*** -0.182 -0.635 -7.911 0.884 0.0106 0.00935 0.0549** 0.102**
(0.0286) (0.351) (1.511) (17.70) (14.27) (0.0145) (0.0391) (0.0262) (0.0447)
Cubic 0.161*** -0.0751 -2.114 -18.72 29.40* -0.00516 0.0197 0.0932** 0.0868
(0.0466) (0.494) (2.223) (20.30) (15.99) (0.0264) (0.0595) (0.0417) (0.0729)
Quartic 0.150*** -0.227 -1.547 -8.301 32.93** -0.000735 0.0253 0.101** 0.0860
(0.0437) (0.547) (2.329) (21.78) (16.13) (0.0266) (0.0589) (0.0416) (0.0696)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.456 -5.154 -105.1 -7.316 0.0838 0.0700 0.404** 0.653*
(3.032) (10.49) (114.0) (96.28) (0.115) (0.297) (0.192) (0.367)
Quadratic -1.409 -5.190 -64.99 6.890 0.0899 0.0752 0.402** 0.735*
(2.648) (11.93) (142.8) (110.9) (0.119) (0.314) (0.200) (0.407)
Cubic -0.572 -14.24 -117.0 183.4* -0.0328 0.139 0.495** 0.503
(3.731) (13.54) (120.5) (106.5) (0.172) (0.425) (0.246) (0.457)
Quartic -1.609 -11.46 -55.53 209.7* -0.00501 0.196 0.579** 0.503
(3.767) (15.91) (141.4) (110.2) (0.182) (0.467) (0.276) (0.438)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000
euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each province and year (110 province and years 2000-2005). Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} and 2 (4) [6] {8}, report the estimates of the Coefficient and
SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 9 (11) [13] {15} and 8
(10) [12] {16}, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below
300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure;
in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of
work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and
the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the
awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal
to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning
firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth
calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth.
SEs are clustered at province level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is
smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.8: Contracting Authority Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.120*** -0.296 -1.226 -27.45** -5.489 0.0136 0.0825* 0.0671* 0.0361
(0.0360) (0.484) (1.504) (10.69) (17.65) (0.0149) (0.0444) (0.0363) (0.116)
Quadratic 0.112*** -0.430 -0.932 -21.93* -5.990 0.0190 0.0872* 0.0671* 0.0227
(0.0331) (0.524) (1.432) (11.72) (16.78) (0.0126) (0.0472) (0.0369) (0.115)
Cubic 0.145** -0.0751 -1.842 -19.91* 14.42 0.0255 0.0720 0.129** -0.0173
(0.0524) (0.468) (2.855) (11.08) (21.65) (0.0437) (0.0496) (0.0487) (0.194)
Quartic 0.134** -0.466 -1.195 -15.27 14.43 0.0299 0.0696 0.133** -0.0468
(0.0515) (0.399) (3.180) (13.84) (22.70) (0.0427) (0.0472) (0.0478) (0.197)
LLR 0.107*** -0.454 -0.794 -21.14* -6.220 0.0190 0.0858* 0.0660* 0.0162
(0.0321) (0.501) (1.445) (11.47) (17.03) (0.0120) (0.0478) (0.0348) (0.115)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -3.638 -14.14 -229.9* -42.29 0.130 0.895 0.570* 0.273
(5.582) (17.78) (114.1) (145.5) (0.132) (0.514) (0.298) (0.897)
Quadratic -3.857 -11.74 -194.9 -50.89 0.206 1.017 0.609* 0.195
(4.262) (18.85) (113.8) (155.8) (0.142) (0.610) (0.324) (1.011)
Cubic -0.673 -14.43 -138.5 85.24 0.215 0.594 0.913* -0.101
(4.150) (23.04) (86.77) (127.4) (0.377) (0.519) (0.442) (1.159)
Quartic -3.867 -10.52 -117.0 87.61 0.260 0.644 0.959* -0.274
(3.167) (28.20) (129.5) (139.4) (0.381) (0.550) (0.466) (1.199)
LLR -8.029 -26.16 -69.75 -36.93 0.269 0.491 0.910** 0.670
(5.814) (18.09) (80.05) (320.2) (0.304) (0.524) (0.360) (0.651)
Observations 935 1,013 1,502 921 723 1,023 1,012 633 741
Average 0.0746 12.60 14.88 374.9 140.4 0.132 0.578 0.0977 0.460
Bandwidth 0.741 0.791 1.311 0.729 0.614 0.794 0.790 0.638 0.723
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005) and contracting authority. |Local
linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator
variable for discretion and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005) and contracting authority.| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9|
and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one
if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the
effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument
(Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy for work assigned warded in the North of Italy; in column 2, Pop, the
number of residents at the provincial level (in 1,000); in column 3, a dummy for work assigned warded in the Piedmont; in column 4, Municipality, a dummy
for work assigned warded by a Municipality; in column 5, Provincia, a dummy for work assigned warded by a Provincia; in column 6, Rome, a dummy for
work assigned warded by in Rome; in column 7, Jud. Eff., lenght of civil trial at province and year level; in column 8, Corruption index, the Golden-Picci
Index (2005) the difference between the actual quantities of public infrastructures and the priced paid to accumulate that stock of capital; in 9 column,
Social Capital Index, the Guiso et al. (2004) measure based on referendum turnout. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the
average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and
it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
clustered at regional level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.9: Controlling for Social Capital, Corruption and Judicial Efficiency - Local Linear Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Social Capital
ITT 0.125*** -0.242 -0.329 -9.030 -4.753 0.0126 0.00244 0.0473* 0.0910
(0.0245) (0.418) (1.488) (16.20) (12.83) (0.0153) (0.0425) (0.0273) (0.0568)
Social Capital 0.366*** -71.65*** -105.1*** -282.1*** -137.8** -0.484*** -0.951*** 0.365*** 0.529**
(0.0747) (2.337) (7.959) (67.68) (54.92) (0.0917) (0.168) (0.108) (0.231)
Fuzzy-RDD -2.403 -4.372 -137.9 -59.11 0.0809 -0.0165 0.328* 0.443
(3.233) (11.40) (111.1) (76.14) (0.113) (0.297) (0.187) (0.305)
Social Capital -71.29*** -109.3*** -331.9*** -144.5* -0.562*** -1.029*** 0.205 0.269
(2.638) (12.20) (113.3) (82.96) (0.138) (0.300) (0.183) (0.335)
Panel B: Corruption
ITT 0.124*** -0.303 -0.753 -11.06 -5.474 0.00928 0.00109 0.0483* 0.0911
(0.0246) (0.444) (1.509) (16.37) (12.95) (0.0155) (0.0428) (0.0274) (0.0570)
Corruption -0.0116** 3.677*** 5.523*** 1.517 -1.072 0.0229** 0.0435*** -0.00491 0.0456***
(0.00492) (0.138) (0.651) (5.269) (4.086) (0.00898) (0.0105) (0.00768) (0.0159)
Fuzzy-RDD -2.445 -7.178 -155.2 -65.42 0.0620 -0.0183 0.347* 0.420
(3.427) (11.64) (111.3) (76.22) (0.115) (0.307) (0.195) (0.303)
Corruption 3.641*** 5.621*** 3.512 -0.693 0.0248** 0.0468*** -0.000879 0.0519***
(0.143) (0.775) (6.223) (4.538) (0.00994) (0.0156) (0.00899) (0.0178)
Panel C: Judcial Efficiency
ITT 0.120*** -0.193 -0.512 -6.295 0.856 0.0121 0.00836 0.0550** 0.103*
(0.0247) (0.345) (1.363) (16.28) (12.83) (0.0147) (0.0401) (0.0276) (0.0562)
Length Civil Trial 0.00361 -0.0905 0.167 1.363 -3.627 0.00186 -0.0134 -0.00314 -0.00907
(0.00492) (0.0851) (0.365) (3.704) (3.173) (0.00365) (0.00892) (0.00669) (0.0121)
Fuzzy-RDD -1.585 -4.657 -100.5 -23.72 0.0934 0.0586 0.405* 0.533
(2.753) (10.67) (124.3) (84.98) (0.122) (0.305) (0.208) (0.365)
Length Civil Trial -0.0897 0.178 0.742 -4.578 0.00163 -0.0131 -0.00508 -0.0124
(0.0842) (0.366) (3.975) (3.530) (0.00379) (0.00902) (0.00727) (0.0144)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from local linear regressions, which includes the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and an interaction between
this variable and an indicator variable for discretion. Panel A (B) [C] includes control for Social Capital index (Corruption index) [Length of civil trial]. Rows 1 (9) [17] and 2 (10) [18] report
the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects); rows 3 (11) [19] and 4 (12) [20] report the Coefficient and SEs (in
parenthesis) of the Social Capital index (Corruption index) [Length of civil trial]. Rows 5 (13) [21] and 6 (14) [22] the IV-LATE estimates estimates of V-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion
on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD); rows 7 (15) [23] and 8 (16) [24] report
the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the Social Capital index (Corruption index) [Length of civil trial]. The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to
one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work
Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between
the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the
winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a
dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning
firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated
using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
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Table A.10: Work Type Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.140*** -0.148 -0.687 -15.35 -9.915 0.0112 -0.00222 0.0505* 0.112**
(0.0265) (0.462) (1.490) (15.68) (12.92) (0.0155) (0.0419) (0.0281) (0.0561)
Quadratic 0.128*** -0.199 -0.376 -8.624 -7.583 0.0115 0.000178 0.0474* 0.105*
(0.0245) (0.509) (1.526) (16.12) (12.88) (0.0157) (0.0430) (0.0277) (0.0570)
Cubic 0.168*** 0.161 -2.155 -11.22 25.48 -0.00755 0.00960 0.0852** 0.0828
(0.0362) (0.585) (1.924) (20.35) (16.86) (0.0210) (0.0563) (0.0383) (0.0746)
Quartic 0.159*** -0.486 -1.807 -1.208 29.49* -0.00489 0.0148 0.0899** 0.0785
(0.0340) (0.703) (1.977) (20.78) (16.84) (0.0213) (0.0575) (0.0378) (0.0758)
LLR 0.126*** -0.221 -0.356 -7.269 -7.035 0.0123 0.000813 0.0473** 0.106*
(0.0243) (0.502) (1.611) (12.84) (9.782) (0.0177) (0.0449) (0.0210) (0.0512)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.289 -5.120 -109.1 -65.41 0.0821 -0.0159 0.340* 0.645*
(4.001) (10.95) (110.7) (85.36) (0.113) (0.300) (0.193) (0.352)
Quadratic -1.479 -2.981 -67.06 -54.76 0.0908 0.00136 0.342* 0.678*
(3.743) (12.00) (124.6) (93.14) (0.124) (0.329) (0.204) (0.397)
Cubic 1.183 -13.49 -67.24 155.0 -0.0460 0.0620 0.476** 0.458
(4.346) (11.79) (120.5) (113.2) (0.130) (0.363) (0.227) (0.437)
Fuzzy RD -3.281 -12.32 -7.685 181.4 -0.0319 0.104 0.541** 0.433
(4.700) (13.22) (131.9) (115.6) (0.140) (0.401) (0.247) (0.437)
LLR -1.865 -4.178 -129.3 -86.74 0.0799 -0.0153 0.340* 0.553
(3.324) (10.20) (76.18) (92.65) (0.130) (0.316) (0.162) (0.355)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for work type and years 2000-2005.|Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of
the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect for work
type and years 2000-2005.| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the
regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19|
and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable
equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal
to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3,
the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the
effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column
6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding
cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent
Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9
column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the
average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and
it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.11: Work Type and Region-Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.137*** -0.166 -1.269 -16.31 -9.749 0.0128 -0.0123 0.0489** 0.107*
(0.0273) (0.396) (1.219) (9.787) (11.72) (0.0177) (0.0440) (0.0215) (0.0584)
Quadratic 0.125*** -0.243 -1.203 -8.772 -6.991 0.0131 -0.0108 0.0447** 0.105*
(0.0257) (0.379) (1.369) (10.53) (10.06) (0.0156) (0.0463) (0.0206) (0.0585)
Cubic 0.173*** -0.175 -2.900*** -11.60 28.31** -0.00244 -0.00183 0.0879** 0.0869
(0.0407) (0.475) (0.947) (18.19) (11.97) (0.0303) (0.0701) (0.0347) (0.0600)
Quartic 0.164*** -0.490 -2.407** -1.694 32.46** 0.000256 0.00737 0.0919** 0.0840
(0.0369) (0.432) (1.013) (20.45) (12.95) (0.0309) (0.0691) (0.0367) (0.0542)
LLR 0.123*** -0.219 -1.129 -7.657 -6.496 0.0138 -0.00917 0.0444** 0.106*
(0.0247) (0.375) (1.355) (10.77) (10.18) (0.0156) (0.0465) (0.0201) (0.0577)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.480 -9.649 -118.5 -63.89 0.0953 -0.0898 0.329* 0.625
(3.413) (9.472) (79.17) (82.46) (0.126) (0.330) (0.156) (0.444)
Quadratic -1.852 -9.626 -70.26 -50.45 0.105 -0.0832 0.322* 0.688
(2.803) (10.96) (86.33) (76.05) (0.120) (0.367) (0.162) (0.496)
Cubic -1.299 -18.05** -66.91 171.6* -0.0149 -0.0118 0.497** 0.486
(3.494) (6.401) (104.9) (80.89) (0.186) (0.456) (0.228) (0.383)
Quartic -3.337 -16.64** -10.34 197.4** 0.00168 0.0526 0.558** 0.466
(3.003) (6.743) (124.8) (87.29) (0.203) (0.488) (0.256) (0.343)
LLR -1.819 -9.478 -119.3* -82.72 0.0997 -0.0873 0.328* 0.493
(2.683) (10.16) (64.40) (95.27) (0.120) (0.338) (0.156) (0.413)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve
price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for work type and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear
regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for
discretion and Fixed Effect for work type and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6]
{8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price
is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on
the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent
variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the
percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until
the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the
project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted
by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public
buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from
the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations;
Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level.
Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.12: Cotrolling for Region-Year Fe, Category FE and Judicial Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.137*** -0.183 -1.278 -16.17 -9.416 0.0129 -0.0125 0.0489** 0.107*
(0.0271) (0.395) (1.230) (9.598) (11.56) (0.0175) (0.0442) (0.0215) (0.0572)
Quadratic 0.125*** -0.286 -1.174 -8.770 -6.751 0.0130 -0.0102 0.0447** 0.105*
(0.0256) (0.374) (1.377) (10.46) (9.969) (0.0157) (0.0464) (0.0206) (0.0565)
Cubic 0.173*** -0.176 -2.941** -11.54 27.85** -0.00234 -0.00253 0.0879** 0.0927
(0.0406) (0.481) (0.983) (18.20) (12.17) (0.0300) (0.0700) (0.0347) (0.0577)
Quartic 0.164*** -0.513 -2.420** -1.644 31.95** 0.000390 0.00713 0.0920** 0.0891
(0.0368) (0.442) (1.052) (20.48) (13.18) (0.0306) (0.0693) (0.0367) (0.0520)
LLR 0.0311 -0.260 -1.097 -7.654 -6.268 0.0137 -0.00856 0.0444** 0.106*
(0.0348) (0.371) (1.361) (10.70) (10.10) (0.0156) (0.0466) (0.0201) (0.0559)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.631 -9.720 -117.4 -61.55 0.0955 -0.0909 0.328* 0.623
(3.387) (9.553) (77.22) (80.84) (0.125) (0.332) (0.155) (0.437)
Quadratic -2.171 -9.395 -70.25 -48.61 0.104 -0.0788 0.322* 0.693
(2.732) (11.05) (85.66) (75.02) (0.121) (0.367) (0.162) (0.485)
Cubic -1.309 -18.29** -66.57 169.4* -0.0143 -0.0164 0.496** 0.520
(3.535) (6.581) (104.9) (82.47) (0.184) (0.455) (0.227) (0.377)
Quartic -3.491 -16.72** -10.03 195.2** 0.00255 0.0509 0.557** 0.495
(3.084) (7.040) (125.0) (89.15) (0.200) (0.489) (0.254) (0.336)
LLR -2.202 -9.374 -118.8* -80.50 0.0997 -0.0876 0.328* 0.476
(2.607) (10.07) (63.59) (94.07) (0.120) (0.339) (0.155) (0.411)
Observations 2,025 3,314 2,392 2,014 1,620 2,163 2,349 1,850 1,310
Average 0.0889 12.88 14.13 376.8 137.3 0.136 0.567 0.0957 0.479
Bandwidth 0.730 1.836 0.864 0.726 0.585 0.780 0.847 0.775 0.572
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, length of civil trial and Fixed Effect for work type, and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions
and years 2000-2005. |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this
variable and an indicator variable for length of civil trial and Fixed Effect for work type, and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years
2000-2005.| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the
outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14)
[16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the
reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for
works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number
of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective
duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost
Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost;
in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner,
a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column,
S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average
value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used
to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the
10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.13: Days of delay divided by the contractual length, Region-Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Deg 1 Deg 2 Deg 3 Deg 4 LLR Deg 1 Deg 2 Deg 3 Deg 4 LLR
ITT 0.0192 0.0163 0.196** 0.199** 0.0163 0.0219 0.0194 0.209** 0.212** 0.0191
(0.0652) (0.0650) (0.0851) (0.0847) (0.0647) (0.0622) (0.0520) (0.0765) (0.0848) (0.0524)
Fuzzy-RDD 0.122 0.112 1.151** 1.194** 0.135 0.137 0.132 1.227*** 1.268** 0.143
(0.412) (0.447) (0.564) (0.568) (0.381) (0.374) (0.341) (0.399) (0.450) (0.419)
Observations 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641
Average 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684
Bandwidth 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Region-Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion on the ratio between the number of days of delay, defined as the difference in days between the end of the project and the contractual deadline,
and the contractual length, defined as the number of days from the first day of work until the contractual deadline. Columns 1 and 6 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear
polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 2 and 7 reports the coefficient from a model that includes quadratic polynomial in the difference of
the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 3 and 8 report the coefficients from a model that includes cubic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000
euro threshold. Columns 4 and 9 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear quartic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 5
and 10 report the coefficients from a model which includes the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable
for discretion. Rows 1 and 5 report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below
300,000 euro (ITT effects). Rows 3 and 4 report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve
price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). Row 5 reports the number of observation; row 6 Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; row 7 Bandwidth reports
the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within
this bandwidth; row 8 reports the use of Fixed Effects for year 2000-2005; row 9 reports the use of Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). SEs are adjusted for
heteroschedasticity (clustered at region level) in columns 1-5 (6-10). Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.14: Work Overall Length
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Deg 1 Deg 2 Deg 3 Deg 4 LLR Deg 1 Deg 2 Deg 3 Deg 4 LLR
ITT -26.00 -20.13 -33.08 -25.17 -18.76 -27.33* -19.61 -34.05 -26.34 -18.37
(17.90) (18.39) (23.80) (24.40) (18.33) (13.37) (14.11) (21.68) (23.25) (14.38)
Fuzzy-RDD -186.6 -155.7 -210.1 -170.0 -202.4 -199.5* -154.2 -216.0 -179.2 -202.3**
(127.9) (141.3) (149.9) (162.8) (125.3) (102.6) (111.2) (134.7) (154.5) (91.73)
Observations 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189
Average 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5 466.5
Bandwidth 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Region-Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion on the work overall length, defined as the number of days from the awarding date until the effective date of delivery of the work. Columns 1 and
6 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 2 and 7 reports the coefficient from a model
that includes quadratic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 3 and 8 report the coefficients from a model that includes cubic polynomial in
the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 4 and 9 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear quartic polynomial in the difference of the reserve
price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 5 and 10 report the coefficients from a model which includes the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and an interaction
between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion. Rows 1 and 5 report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator
variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Rows 3 and 4 report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which
use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). Row 5 reports the number of observation; row 6 the average value of the dependent
variables; row 6 Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; row 7 Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure,
and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth; row 8 reports the use of Fixed Effects for year 2000-2005; row 9 reports the
use of Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public constructon works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.15: Baseline Model, Missing Values Not Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.166*** 0.191 -1.464 -23.53 19.36 0.0133 0.0132 0.0513** 0.0959**
(0.0223) (0.520) (1.115) (16.26) (13.21) (0.0143) (0.0368) (0.0209) (0.0448)
Quadratic 0.153*** 0.151 -1.483 -13.63 25.76* 0.0140 0.0137 0.0571*** 0.0853*
(0.0207) (0.525) (1.112) (16.33) (13.35) (0.0147) (0.0377) (0.0210) (0.0457)
Cubic 0.187*** -0.0601 -0.430 -39.29* 5.687 0.00887 0.0170 0.0758*** 0.0617
(0.0297) (0.686) (1.412) (20.64) (16.50) (0.0200) (0.0489) (0.0281) (0.0590)
Quartic 0.178*** 0.0248 -0.700 -35.54* 7.823 0.00941 0.0169 0.0673** 0.0549
(0.0280) (0.694) (1.435) (21.06) (16.78) (0.0208) (0.0500) (0.0282) (0.0601)
LLR 0.151*** 0.134 -1.470 -11.88 27.55** 0.0142 0.0133 0.0546*** 0.0844*
(0.0204) (0.525) (1.114) (16.30) (13.29) (0.0147) (0.0377) (0.0208) (0.0458)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear 1.229 -10.44 -141.6 126.5 0.0851 0.0807 0.285** 0.485**
(3.372) (7.811) (96.76) (92.90) (0.0916) (0.225) (0.118) (0.239)
Quadratic 1.042 -10.30 -89.58 178.6* 0.0965 0.0924 0.346*** 0.474*
(3.647) (7.579) (106.1) (102.7) (0.102) (0.253) (0.130) (0.264)
Cubic -0.341 -2.943 -228.9* 28.83 0.0470 0.0888 0.391*** 0.307
(3.882) (9.584) (121.4) (84.52) (0.106) (0.255) (0.151) (0.301)
Cubic -0.341 -2.943 -228.9* 28.83 0.0470 0.0888 0.391*** 0.307
(3.882) (9.584) (121.4) (84.52) (0.106) (0.255) (0.151) (0.301)
LLR 1.288 -10.30 -208.2** 167.2 0.0815 0.0791 0.263** 0.502**
(3.303) (7.205) (100.6) (115.3) (0.0911) (0.221) (0.125) (0.222)
Observations 3,250 3,524 4,958 2,003 1,554 2,954 2,977 3,292 2,033
Average 0.105 12.83 15.09 380.1 139.5 0.142 0.575 0.0936 0.473
Bandwidth 0.691 0.767 1.268 0.550 0.431 0.785 0.684 0.832 0.575
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve
price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve price from the
300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect years 2000-2005.| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5]
{7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal
to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates
of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument
(Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in
column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from
the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between
the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost
(reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the
same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same
buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the
number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth SEs are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works with missing values in the dependent variable are not dropped.
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Table A.16: Drop Single Bidders - Just One Invited - Region-Year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.140*** -0.287 -2.066 -21.13* -2.789 0.00756 -0.00319 0.0421* 0.122*
(0.0323) (0.370) (1.220) (11.38) (11.54) (0.0170) (0.0598) (0.0217) (0.0613)
Quadratic 0.129*** -0.312 -2.331 -14.33 1.133 0.00780 0.00266 0.0381* 0.113*
(0.0299) (0.373) (1.409) (11.82) (11.43) (0.0141) (0.0612) (0.0212) (0.0626)
Cubic 0.167*** -0.163 -2.184* -17.12 29.15* 0.00179 -0.0269 0.0808* 0.0631
(0.0442) (0.484) (1.057) (21.19) (15.18) (0.0249) (0.0664) (0.0385) (0.0743)
Quartic 0.158*** -0.627 -1.535 -6.588 31.43* 0.00448 -0.0198 0.0893** 0.0703
(0.0410) (0.455) (1.168) (23.73) (15.11) (0.0259) (0.0661) (0.0399) (0.0681)
LLR 0.127*** -0.324 -2.205 -13.06 1.234 0.00849 0.00358 0.0382* 0.116*
(0.0290) (0.347) (1.378) (12.20) (11.30) (0.0143) (0.0614) (0.0208) (0.0609)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -2.650 -15.80 -150.5 -17.69 0.0556 -0.0232 0.266 0.722
(3.227) (9.106) (93.02) (75.31) (0.120) (0.438) (0.156) (0.487)
Quadratic -2.406 -18.30 -110.6 7.903 0.0614 0.0212 0.261 0.732
(2.730) (10.85) (95.61) (78.89) (0.106) (0.483) (0.162) (0.530)
Cubic -1.227 -14.28 -103.5 173.1 0.0112 -0.157 0.450 0.347
(3.570) (8.359) (124.6) (105.5) (0.154) (0.398) (0.257) (0.454)
Quartic -4.290 -10.97 -42.15 183.8 0.0300 -0.122 0.523* 0.387
(3.286) (8.774) (149.9) (104.9) (0.170) (0.413) (0.277) (0.426)
LLR -2.590 -18.32 -157.5* -48.83 0.0563 -0.0285 0.266 0.685
(2.429) (11.63) (86.38) (80.83) (0.116) (0.427) (0.165) (0.471)
Observations 2,044 3,348 2,576 2,049 1,571 2,220 2,035 1,791 1,257
Average 0.0841 12.91 14.01 376.5 137.9 0.136 0.564 0.0944 0.477
Bandwidth 0.740 2.913 0.940 0.743 0.573 0.806 0.738 0.753 0.553
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve
price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the
difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect for
each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs
(in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows
11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the
indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata,
a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in
column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent
the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6,
Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in
column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy
equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy
equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent
variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of
discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and
at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works assigned with Trattativa Privata, one bidder and only one invited bidder are dropped.
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Table A.17: Drop Single Bidders - Less 5 Invited - Region-Year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.137*** -0.164 -2.007 -21.16* -11.00 0.00669 0.00127 0.0391* 0.0930*
(0.0317) (0.426) (1.234) (11.70) (11.28) (0.0168) (0.0573) (0.0220) (0.0472)
Quadratic 0.127*** -0.276 -2.304 -14.27 -8.253 0.00649 0.00643 0.0359* 0.101**
(0.0296) (0.389) (1.435) (12.48) (10.66) (0.0140) (0.0587) (0.0203) (0.0451)
Cubic 0.163*** -0.338 -2.112* -19.13 26.06* 0.00322 -0.0290 0.0805** 0.106
(0.0445) (0.444) (1.052) (20.56) (13.96) (0.0252) (0.0692) (0.0367) (0.0784)
Quartic 0.154*** -0.627 -1.377 -7.778 31.13** 0.00628 -0.0215 0.0859** 0.0884
(0.0409) (0.435) (1.136) (23.01) (13.27) (0.0256) (0.0697) (0.0392) (0.0775)
LLR 0.124*** -0.227 -2.167 -12.97 -7.886 0.00724 0.00775 0.0357* 0.0994**
(0.0285) (0.395) (1.405) (12.80) (10.48) (0.0141) (0.0590) (0.0200) (0.0447)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -1.471 -15.50 -157.7 -73.95 0.0491 0.00942 0.257 0.567
(3.700) (9.334) (98.52) (83.83) (0.118) (0.425) (0.170) (0.386)
Quadratic -2.153 -18.27 -115.9 -60.09 0.0511 0.0518 0.254 0.669
(2.903) (11.14) (104.1) (81.68) (0.105) (0.464) (0.166) (0.417)
Cubic -2.557 -13.97 -112.1 150.1 0.0210 -0.178 0.457* 0.572
(3.278) (8.287) (118.4) (86.42) (0.161) (0.435) (0.245) (0.519)
Quartic -4.307 -10.05 -47.85 184.6* 0.0435 -0.139 0.517* 0.494
(3.121) (8.580) (140.5) (86.00) (0.172) (0.458) (0.270) (0.514)
LLR -2.010 -18.26 -159.5* -80.97 0.0458 0.0107 0.258 0.467
(2.804) (12.02) (85.69) (82.92) (0.120) (0.426) (0.176) (0.456)
Observations 2,048 3,253 2,566 2,017 1,680 2,241 2,095 1,859 1,380
Average 0.0825 12.93 14.03 376.6 137.3 0.136 0.564 0.0941 0.487
Bandwidth 0.743 1.738 0.937 0.732 0.610 0.819 0.761 0.783 0.608
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear regressions (LLR)
include the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion
and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of
the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro
(ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes
(Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables
are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the
percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work
until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective
end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve
price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the
same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the
same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations
reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this
bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works assigned with Trattativa Privata, one bidder and only less than 5 invited bidder are dropped.
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Table A.18: Drop Single Bidders - Less 5 Invited or Missing - Region-Year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.125*** -0.257 -1.549 -12.30 -4.243 -0.0146 -0.00884 0.0379 0.103**
(0.0220) (0.441) (1.281) (11.62) (12.45) (0.0123) (0.0508) (0.0297) (0.0438)
Quadratic 0.118*** -0.292 -1.743 -6.144 -0.328 -0.0169* -0.00373 0.0419 0.106**
(0.0200) (0.436) (1.482) (11.62) (12.12) (0.00923) (0.0528) (0.0286) (0.0430)
Cubic 0.130*** -0.924 -2.289** -19.87 27.06 -0.00559 -0.00708 0.109** 0.123
(0.0373) (0.537) (0.938) (20.85) (16.03) (0.0151) (0.0718) (0.0406) (0.0730)
Quartic 0.120*** -0.905* -1.524 -12.94 29.42* -0.00150 -0.00197 0.108** 0.110
(0.0365) (0.480) (1.047) (22.58) (16.01) (0.0147) (0.0724) (0.0414) (0.0717)
LLR 0.116*** -0.266 -1.616 -5.024 -0.251 -0.0153 -0.00298 0.0400 0.105**
(0.0198) (0.438) (1.457) (11.83) (12.01) (0.00989) (0.0528) (0.0284) (0.0428)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -2.236 -12.79 -103.7 -30.51 -0.124 -0.0724 0.263 0.710
(3.709) (10.59) (107.0) (92.78) (0.115) (0.426) (0.217) (0.417)
Quadratic -2.489 -14.68 -55.22 -2.594 -0.150 -0.0329 0.317 0.792*
(3.577) (12.27) (107.8) (95.96) (0.0963) (0.469) (0.231) (0.447)
Cubic -7.731* -17.43** -138.1 190.5 -0.0425 -0.0518 0.680** 0.805
(3.704) (8.065) (141.9) (123.3) (0.114) (0.529) (0.304) (0.541)
Quartic -7.185* -13.08 -95.45 202.3 -0.0121 -0.0154 0.684** 0.740
(3.384) (8.849) (162.5) (121.4) (0.118) (0.565) (0.298) (0.544)
LLR -2.480 -14.23 -93.12 -68.17 -0.132 -0.0822 0.209 0.629
(3.470) (13.74) (99.79) (95.84) (0.109) (0.415) (0.228) (0.490)
Observations 2,323 2,883 2,439 2,118 1,562 2,586 2,210 1,562 1,354
Average 0.0771 12.83 14.16 377 137.8 0.134 0.566 0.0967 0.487
Bandwidth 0.849 1.243 0.890 0.772 0.573 0.954 0.808 0.656 0.599
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the
reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear regressions (LLR)
include the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and
Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the
Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT
effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa
Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are:in
column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage
discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the
effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the
project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price
discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same
province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the
same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations
reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this
bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents).
The number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works assigned with Trattativa Privata, one bidder and less than five invited bidder or the number of invited bidders
is missing are dropped.
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Table A.19: Nord-Center Regions - Region-Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.148*** -0.646* -2.984* -10.28 12.66 -0.00542 -0.0292 0.0550** 0.0897
(0.0320) (0.314) (1.516) (15.68) (14.59) (0.0166) (0.0712) (0.0230) (0.0575)
Quadratic 0.136*** -0.786* -3.006* 3.825 15.69 -0.00721 -0.0247 0.0484* 0.0989
(0.0294) (0.352) (1.400) (17.83) (13.72) (0.0140) (0.0733) (0.0218) (0.0561)
Cubic 0.189*** -0.316 -2.716 -14.19 29.02 0.0125 -0.0198 0.0917** 0.119
(0.0447) (0.556) (1.501) (31.31) (17.29) (0.0219) (0.0646) (0.0397) (0.0851)
Quartic 0.178*** -0.218 -2.541 -11.77 31.65* 0.0165 -0.0148 0.0966** 0.102
(0.0404) (0.513) (1.444) (33.95) (16.30) (0.0201) (0.0638) (0.0413) (0.0845)
LLR 0.134*** -0.789 -2.984** 3.905 16.35 -0.00647 -0.0239 0.0484 0.0971
(0.0280) (0.492) (1.265) (19.23) (14.56) (0.0137) (0.0499) (0.0304) (0.0598)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -4.404* -20.94* -64.75 71.97 -0.0380 -0.193 0.334* 0.513
(2.057) (10.82) (101.8) (79.54) (0.119) (0.495) (0.154) (0.421)
Quadratic -5.526** -20.61* 26.02 95.95 -0.0521 -0.178 0.312* 0.617
(2.127) (9.767) (120.8) (82.11) (0.105) (0.550) (0.154) (0.460)
Cubic -1.972 -18.85 -74.24 170.4 0.0758 -0.104 0.463* 0.613
(3.446) (11.02) (158.5) (121.1) (0.126) (0.350) (0.246) (0.507)
Quartic -1.512 -16.44 -64.80 185.0 0.110 -0.0823 0.525* 0.548
(3.509) (10.39) (181.1) (109.7) (0.128) (0.362) (0.269) (0.513)
LLR -5.843* -20.90* -80.64 62.33 -0.0487 -0.195 0.332* 0.427
(3.085) (10.84) (109.3) (79.70) (0.104) (0.489) (0.152) (0.488)
Observations 1,714 2,147 2,561 1,481 1,156 2,196 1,683 1,624 1,196
Average 0.0986 11.25 12.32 374.7 134.4 0.126 0.550 0.101 0.506
Bandwidth 0.718 0.897 1.286 0.619 0.489 0.917 0.701 0.780 0.600
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price
from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of
the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect for each region-year
pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the
regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and
12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if
the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works
assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in
column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works;
in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the
difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy
equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has
won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a
limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal
bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve
price within this bandwidth. SEs are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) and works from the North and Center of Italy.
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Table A.20: Performance Missing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
MODEL Deg. 1 Deg. 2 Deg. 3 Deg. 4 LLR Deg. 1 Deg. 2 Deg. 3 Deg. 4 LLR
Panel A: Missing Performance
ITT 0.029 0.039 0.060 0.063 0.036 0.029 0.036 0.052 0.055 0.034
(0.029) (0.030) (0.039) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Fuzzy-RDD 0.182 0.261 0.349 0.386 0.166 0.199 0.264 0.328 0.369 0.210
(0.182) (0.202) (0.229) (0.245) (0.187) (0.212) (0.265) (0.238) (0.242) (0.202)
Observations 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475 4,475
Average 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.370
Bandwidth 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951
Panel B: Missing Incumbency
ITT -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Fuzzy-RDD -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011
Average 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162
Bandwidth 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Region-Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion on an indicator variable equal to one if the delay variable, or the cost overrun variable is missing (Panel A) or the incumbency variable is missing
(Panel B). Columns 1 and 6 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 2 and 7 reports
the coefficient from a model that includes quadratic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 3 and 8 report the coefficients from a model that
includes cubic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 4 and 9 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear quartic polynomial in
the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold. Columns 5 and 10 report the coefficients from a model that includes linear polynomial in the difference of the reserve price
from the 300,000 euro threshold and an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro. Rows 1 (5) and 2 (6) report the estimates
of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Rows 3 (7) and 4 (8)
report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument
(Fuzzy RDD). Row 9 reports the number of observation; row 10 Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; row 11 Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth; row 12 reports the use of
Fixed Effects for year 2000-2005; row 13 reports the use of Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). SEs are adjusted for heteroschedasticity (clustered at region
level) in columns 1-5 (6-10). Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The number of observations is smaller
compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and works with missing value in the
dependent variables are not dropped.
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Table A.21: Placebo Test: Simulated Threshold at 400,00 euro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear -0.00521 -1.059 -0.517 17.83 13.40 -0.00134 -0.0547 -0.0238 -0.0516
(0.0236) (0.661) (1.539) (15.27) (12.90) (0.0145) (0.0478) (0.0305) (0.0665)
Quadratic -0.00518 -1.153* 0.618 16.30 1.939 0.0103 -0.0610 -0.0144 -0.0516
(0.0236) (0.673) (1.814) (18.91) (14.76) (0.0149) (0.0482) (0.0318) (0.0665)
Cubic 0.00371 -0.568 0.857 26.40 0.837 0.0118 -0.00643 0.000512 -0.0365
(0.0326) (0.881) (1.908) (20.11) (17.46) (0.0177) (0.0638) (0.0407) (0.0889)
Quartic 0.00348 -0.623 0.583 16.88 -5.885 -7.73e-05 -0.00778 -0.0150 -0.0365
(0.0326) (0.903) (2.281) (24.85) (20.57) (0.0182) (0.0644) (0.0426) (0.0889)
LLR -0.00487 -1.126* 0.308 12.23 4.982 0.00723 -0.0592 -0.0193 -0.0512
(0.0236) (0.666) (1.690) (17.35) (13.95) (0.0146) (0.0479) (0.0312) (0.0665)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear 17.70 8.063 -369.3 -181.6 0.0173 1.002 0.316 3.568
(13.07) (24.38) (336.8) (181.3) (0.187) (0.936) (0.409) (8.326)
Quadratic 23.97 -15.12 -408.0 -43.79 -0.224 1.297 0.253 3.570
(17.88) (43.87) (512.5) (335.0) (0.332) (1.141) (0.562) (8.333)
Cubic -25.13 -16.91 -407.5 -31.49 -0.708 -0.221 0.0372 2.653
(44.91) (37.08) (339.4) (659.3) (1.481) (2.214) (2.952) (9.956)
Quartic -48.98 132.7 -64,586 -2,614 -0.0508 -0.395 -4.845 2.632
(113.6) (1,009) (6.338e+06) (31,780) (12.00) (3.328) (44.55) (9.830)
LLR 47.08 -52.43 -317.7 314.7 -0.782 2.911 0.115 3.885
(51.30) (95.61) (1,047) (718.8) (0.965) (3.173) (1.185) (11.99)
Observations 1,149 1,813 2,546 2,848 2,300 2,238 1,748 1,622 918
Average 0.0331 13.18 15.89 403.4 149.2 0.138 0.538 0.102 0.477
Bandwidth 0.657 1.063 1.481 1.630 1.345 1.309 1.013 1.106 0.650
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price
from the 400,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve price from the 400,000
euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect years 2000-2005.| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2
(4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve
price is below 400,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion
on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 400,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent
variables are: in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the
percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the
effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project
and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the
winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer;
in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current
auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports
the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is
used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at
the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.22: Placebo Test: Simulated Threshold at 250,00 euro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear -0.0103 0.793 1.250 3.150 19.55* -0.0380** -0.0494 -0.00627 -0.00813
(0.0271) (0.596) (1.480) (16.07) (11.35) (0.0172) (0.0477) (0.0312) (0.0560)
Quadratic -0.00922 0.976 1.301 3.342 19.23 -0.0377** -0.0536 -0.00463 -0.00668
(0.0273) (0.647) (1.518) (16.16) (11.83) (0.0170) (0.0478) (0.0312) (0.0562)
Cubic 0.0181 1.028 1.576 4.138 25.01* -0.0417* -0.0844 -0.0131 0.0258
(0.0349) (0.782) (2.069) (21.03) (14.50) (0.0222) (0.0640) (0.0410) (0.0755)
Quartic 0.000479 0.831 1.901 9.123 25.75 -0.0372 -0.0799 -0.0132 0.0248
(0.0354) (0.907) (2.194) (21.22) (15.70) (0.0226) (0.0640) (0.0410) (0.0758)
LLR -0.0111 0.934 1.326 3.436 18.95 -0.0371** -0.0521 -0.00483 -0.00661
(0.0272) (0.626) (1.505) (16.13) (11.64) (0.0170) (0.0478) (0.0312) (0.0562)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear -17.55 -53.49 -263.5 -680.2 1.907 240.4 0.460 0.229
(14.63) (77.22) (1,421) (713.3) (2.699) (33,796) (2.387) (1.589)
Quadratic -43.91 -77.23 -310.8 -1,021 2.449 -34.33 0.376 0.207
(54.60) (135.8) (1,635) (1,555) (4.448) (640.5) (2.591) (1.750)
Cubic 74.73 64.80 185.5 1,175 -1.693 -24.06 0.444 -1.935
(184.9) (135.9) (1,007) (1,981) (2.488) (258.0) (1.414) (8.464)
Quartic -146.6 -645.3 1,945 -5,205 25.42 -16.07 0.448 -2.441
(893.4) (7,575) (15,603) (36,955) (611.2) (121.9) (1.421) (12.79)
LLR 319.0 166.2 -5,338 585.0 2.684 15.90 0.598 0.313
(4,339) (1,611) (330,300) (7,382) (16.94) (192.1) (1.641) (0.919)
Observations 1,834 2,047 1,898 1,825 1,934 1,876 1,676 1,504 1,244
Average 0.113 12.59 13.48 352.1 128.8 0.135 0.579 0.111 0.456
Bandwidth 0.573 0.763 0.628 0.565 0.663 0.608 0.463 0.488 0.414
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price
from the 250,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the difference of the reserve price from the 250,000
euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect years 2000-2005.| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and
2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the
reserve price is below 250,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of
discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 250,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The
dependent variables are:in column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate,
the percentage discount over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the
effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and
the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning
rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8,
Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction; in 9
column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm.Observations reports the number of observations; Average reports the average value
of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate
the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the
5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Table A.23: Turin Sample FP - Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Correlation
ITT 0.0391 1.072 -3.877 -69.86*** -65.13*** 0.0692* 0.0430 0.0725 0.0828
(0.0428) (1.352) (3.137) (20.19) (14.87) (0.0375) (0.0567) (0.0640) (0.0746)
Fuzzy-RDD 24.95 -95.95 -8,143 -7,591 2.194 1.655 1.854 1.798
(46.71) (117.6) (44,472) (42,074) (3.277) (3.629) (2.668) (2.450)
Panel B: Linear Model
ITT 0.197*** -0.844 -3.574 -52.37 -60.49** 0.0460 -0.0176 0.189* 0.347**
(0.0687) (2.641) (5.922) (39.86) (29.93) (0.0734) (0.124) (0.114) (0.136)
Fuzzy-RDD -4.250 -18.14 -267.9 -309.4* 0.273 -0.0963 0.961 2.180*
(12.91) (29.98) (200.4) (184.0) (0.433) (0.683) (0.714) (1.268)
Panel C: Category FE
ITT 0.188** -1.969 -7.363 -5.127 -42.95 0.0428 0.0636 0.249** 0.308**
(0.0728) (2.341) (6.302) (39.43) (31.28) (0.0790) (0.126) (0.117) (0.147)
Fuzzy-RDD -10.61 -39.14 -36.17 -303.0 0.312 0.319 1.326 1.787
(11.71) (35.70) (272.9) (261.1) (0.579) (0.633) (0.867) (1.157)
Observations 221 215 220 172 172 195 212 221 181
Average 0.109 28.57 17.08 370.4 102.8 0.259 0.783 0.330 0.497
Notes: The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions that includes Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005, Panel A. (linear polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from
the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005, Panel B) [linear polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, Fixed Effects for
years 2000-2005 and Fixed Effects for work type, Panel C]. Rows 1 (5) [9] and 2 (6) [10], report the estimates of the Coefficient and SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes
on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Rows 3 (7) [11] and 4 (8) [12], report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on
the outcomes (Trattativa Privata), which use the indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy RDD). The dependent variables are: in
column 1, Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount over the reserve price;
in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration
of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference
in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is
located in the same province of the public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer
within a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number of observations; Average
reports the average value of the dependent variables; SEs are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2003 and 2005 and by the county and municipality of Turin, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005
equivalents).
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Table A.24: Incumbency and Contract Execution: Delay - With Region-Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Delay Delay Delay Delay Delay Delay
MODEL FE PSM RW FE PSM RW
Full Sample
Below 300,000 euro Above 300,000 euro
Incumbent Winner -17.29* -16.75 -16.85* -0.659 2.040 -2.025
(9.427) (11.52) (8.895) (12.16) (14.33) (11.28)
Observations 1,343 1,343 1,343 1,089 1,089 1,089
Optimal Bandwidth
Below 300,000 euro Above 300,000 euro
Incumbent Winner -10.14 -15.06 -7.785 -9.226 -8.255 -11.42
(11.74) (13.83) (10.46) (17.77) (20.46) (15.59)
Observations 976 976 976 440 440 440
Notes: The table reports the effect of incumbency, defined as a dummy equal to one if the winning firm has won a contract
with the public buyer in the past year, on days of delay, defined as the difference in days between the end of the project and
the contractual deadline. Columns 1 through 3 report the results for the public works below 300,000 euros. Columns 4 through
6 report the results for the public works above 300,000 euros. Column 1 and 4 report the results of model including Fixed
Effect for each province and year (110 province and years 2000-2005) and controls for the reserve price (cubic polynomial),
number of bidders, contractual length, dummy for Trattativa Privata and winning rebate. Column 2 and 5 report the results for
a Propensity Score Matching model; the project are matched using a propensity score on the reserve price (cubic polynomial),
number of bidders, contractual length, dummy for Trattativa Privata, winning rebate and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair
(20 regions and years 2000-2005). Column 3 and 6 report the results for a Propensity Score Reweigthing model; the propensity
score is constructed as in the Propensity Score Matching model. Observations reports the number of observations. Standard
Errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Source: Statistics
for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005
equivalents).
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Table A.25: Incumbency and Past Performance -Region Year Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Win Win Win Win
Full Sample
Below 300,000 Above 300,000
Average Delay -0.00141* -0.00178** -0.000689 -0.000891
(0.000670) (0.000690) (0.000614) (0.000650)
Observations 11,079 11,079 12,008 12,008
Optimal Bandwidth
Below 300,000 Above 300,000
Average Delay -0.00166* -0.00201** -0.000685 -0.000933
(0.000808) (0.000863) (0.000823) (0.000880)
Observations 8,658 8,658 5,485 5,485
Notes: The table reports the effect of past performance, defined as the average number of days of
delay in work executed in the previous year by the incumbent firm, on the probability of winning
a auction today. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the incumbent firm have
win an auction today. Panel A (B) reports the results on the full sample (Optimal Bandwidth
sample, calculated using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure). Columns 1 and 2 report
the results for the public works below 300,000 euros. Columns 3 through 4 reports the results for
the public works above 300,000 euros. Columns 1 and 3 report the results of a model including as
control region-year fixed effect (20 regions and years 2000-2005) and reserve price (cubic polynomial).
Columns 2 and 4 report the results of a model that add as additional control the contracting authority
experience, defined as the number of works awarded in the past year. Observations reports the number
of observations. Standard Errors are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5%
(**), and at the 1% (***). Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between
2000 and 2005, with project value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro.
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Figure A.1: Discontinuity Test of Auctions Reserve Price Around the Threshold, by macro-
areas
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Notes: The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold (vertical line). Circles
are average observed values, the bold solid line is a kernel estimate (see McCrary, 2008), and the two thin lines are 95%
confidence intervals. In these four sub-sample the McCrary (2008) discontinuity tests (standard errors) are: -.15 (.13) for
the overall sample; -.08 (.17) for the North; -.27 (.23) for the Centre, and -.13 (.30) for the South. These tests suggests that
the null hypothesis of no sorting cannot be rejected at standard statistical confidence levels.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in
100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure A.2: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths, Region-Year Fixed Effects
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Notes: The graph report estimates for discretion from regressions, which include a cubic polynomial in the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed
Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). The bold solid line reports point estimates at different bandwidths of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros (ITT effects), and the two thin lines are 90% confidence intervals. The vertical line denotes the optimal bandwidth computed using the
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth.. Trattativa Privata is
a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure. Winning Rebate is the percentage discount over the reserve price. Work Length the number of days from
the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works. Delay is the difference in days between the effective end of the project
and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding
cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy equal to one for a winner that has
won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction. S.R.L is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure A.3: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths, Local Linear Regression
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Notes: The graph reports estimates for discretion from a local linear regressions, which includes the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros and an interaction between these two variables and Fixed Effects for years 2000-2005. The bold solid line reports point estimates
at different bandwidths of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros (ITT effects), and the two thin lines are 90% confidence intervals.
The vertical line denotes the optimal bandwidth computed using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of
works with reserve price within this bandwidth.. Trattativa Privata is a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure. Winning Rebate is the percentage
discount over the reserve price. Work Length the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works.
Delay is the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding
cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the public
buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year from the current auction. S.R.L is a
dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Figure A.4: Estimated Effects at Different Bandwidths, Local Linear Regression with Region-Year Fixed Effects
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Notes: The graph reports estimates for discretion from local linear regressions, which includes the difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros, an interaction between these two variables and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). The bold
solid line reports point estimates at different bandwidths of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euros (ITT effects), and the two
thin lines are 90% confidence intervals. The vertical line denotes the optimal bandwidth computed using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate
the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth.. Trattativa Privata is a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary
procedure. Winning Rebate is the percentage discount over the reserve price. Work Length the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end of the project, which
represent the effective duration of the works. Delay is the difference in days between the effective end of the project and the contractual deadline. Cost Overrun is the ratio between the
difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by the winning rebate) and the awarding cost. Local Winner is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is
located in the same province of the public buyer. Incumbent Winner is a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within a year
from the current auction. S.R.L is a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm.
Source: Statistics for all the public construction works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euros (2005 equivalents).
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Table B.1: Roads Sample - Region-Year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variables Trattativa Rebate N. Bidders Work Leng. Delay C. Over. Local W. Inc. W. S.R.L.
Panel A: Intention-to-Treat
Linear 0.232*** 0.408 -0.539 -25.69 -6.649 -0.00318 0.0833* 0.0331 -0.0335
(0.0742) (0.427) (2.620) (30.11) (12.24) (0.0111) (0.0403) (0.0541) (0.0529)
Quaratic 0.219*** 0.407 -1.646 -27.97 -6.460 0.00189 0.0734 0.0413 -0.0290
(0.0686) (0.453) (2.445) (28.13) (11.86) (0.0107) (0.0436) (0.0510) (0.0561)
Cubic 0.269*** -0.102 -5.575* -54.39 -13.81 -0.0245 0.0842 0.0568 -0.0227
(0.0885) (0.601) (3.148) (35.79) (16.84) (0.0166) (0.0554) (0.0795) (0.0479)
Quartic 0.255*** -0.0220 -5.251 -49.75 -13.17 -0.0195 0.0833 0.0577 -0.0181
(0.0801) (0.572) (3.423) (32.72) (15.49) (0.0151) (0.0537) (0.0812) (0.0490)
LLR 0.213*** 0.432 -1.290 -24.91 -5.742 0.00353 0.0732 0.0389 -0.0274
(0.0642) (0.449) (2.497) (26.53) (11.28) (0.00986) (0.0422) (0.0502) (0.0566)
Panel B: Fuzzy-RDD
Linear 2.755 -3.423 -119.0 -42.33 -0.0143 0.359* 0.148 -0.206
(2.606) (16.03) (106.5) (68.94) (0.0461) (0.168) (0.210) (0.357)
Quadratic 2.779 -10.54 -136.7 -41.60 0.00882 0.334 0.193 -0.181
(2.799) (14.37) (103.2) (68.39) (0.0520) (0.207) (0.199) (0.373)
Cubic -0.412 -22.47* -207.3** -56.53 -0.0933 0.334 0.217 -0.0895
(2.524) (10.76) (84.03) (54.16) (0.0598) (0.230) (0.257) (0.207)
Quartic -0.0931 -22.45 -196.8** -56.62 -0.0798 0.347 0.228 -0.0733
(2.436) (12.86) (82.30) (52.53) (0.0602) (0.240) (0.272) (0.212)
LLR 3.918 -28.09 -84.93 -25.94 0.0843 0.319 0.370 -0.0719
(3.474) (39.08) (301.9) (81.35) (1.735) (0.276) (1.168) (0.515)
Observations 1,497 2,972 2,781 1,948 2,859 1,745 1,848 1,749 2,469
Average 0.0982 12.81 33.03 304 123.9 0.110 0.566 0.157 0.507
Bandwidth 0.528 1.036 0.935 0.687 0.960 0.619 0.656 0.680 1.062
The table reports estimates for discretion from regressions, which include linear (quadratic) [cubic] {quartic} polynomial in the difference of the reserve price
from the 300,000 euro threshold and Fixed Effect for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005). |Local linear regressions (LLR) include the
difference of the reserve price from the 300,000 euro threshold, an interaction between this variable and an indicator variable for discretion and Fixed Effect
for each region-year pair (20 regions and years 2000-2005).| Panel A, rows 1 (3) [5] {7} |9| and 2 (4) [6] {8} |10|, report the estimates of the Coefficient and
SEs (in parenthesis) of the regression of the outcomes on an indicator variable equal to one if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro (ITT effects). Panel
B, rows 11 (13) [15] {17} |19| and 12 (14) [16] {18} |20|, report the IV-LATE estimates of the effects of discretion on the outcomes (Trattativa Privata),
which use the indicator variable equal 1 if the reserve price is below 300,000 euro as instrument (Fuzzy-RDD). The dependent variables are: in column 1,
Trattativa Privata, a dummy equal to one for works assigned with a more discretionary procedure; in column 2, Winning Rebate, the percentage discount
over the reserve price; in column 3, the number of bidders; in column 4, Work Length, the number of days from the first day of work until the effective end
of the project, which represent the effective duration of the works; in column 5, Delay, the difference in days between the effective end of the project and
the contractual deadline; in column 6, Cost Overrun, the ratio between the difference in the final cost and the awarding cost (reserve price discounted by
the winning rebate) and the awarding cost; in column 7, Local Winner, a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is located in the same province of the
public buyer; in column 8, Incumbent Winner, a dummy equal to one for a winner that has won at least one other auction held by the same buyer within
a year from the current auction; in 9 column, S.R.L a dummy equal to one if the winning firm is a limited liability firm. Observations reports the number
of observations; Average reports the average value of the dependent variables; Bandwidth reports the optimal bandwidth calculated using the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure, and it is used to estimate the effects of discretion for the sample of works with reserve price within this bandwidth. SEs
are clustered at region level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
Source: Statistics for all the public road works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with reserve price y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000 euro (2005 equivalents). The
number of observations is smaller compared the full sample described in Table 1, because we restrict the analysis the optimal bandwidth sample, as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.1: Discontinuity Test of Auctions Reserve Price Around the Threshold for Roads
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Notes: The running variable is the difference between the reserve price and the 300,000 euro threshold (vertical line). Circles
are average observed values, the bold solid line is a kernel estimate (see McCrary, 2008), and the two thin lines are 95%
confidence intervals.
Source: Statistics for all the public road works tendered between 2000 and 2005, with auction value y ∈ [2, 5], in 100,000
euros (2005 equivalents).
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